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The communist takeover of Hong Kong after 1997 has 
greatly disturbed the public at large and has raised doubt 
about the stability of the territory during the 
transitional period and post-1997. 
Against this backdrop, a survey is done in April 1990 
to investigate the adolescents‘ political orientations 
toward China and to trace the sources of influence as well 
as the relative influence among parents, school, and mass 
media. 
A disproportionate sample of 883 Form four students, 
including those from centrist and partisan schools are 
asked to fill in a self-administered questionnaire. 
Survey results show that these young people in general 
hold unfavourable attitudes toward China which include low 
level of trust, poor evaluation of Beijing officials and 
the Socialist regime, a moderate sense of patriotism, and 
relatively stronger identification with the territory than 
China. 
The general patterns of attitudes among the students 
do not deviate much from their perceived parental 
attitudes, exhibiting a cross-generational agreement. 
The major difference lies in the national 
identification. While the students see themselves as Hong 
Kong people, their parents stick to their Chinese origin. 
This implies that the younger generation have begun to 
develop a sense of belonging to the territory, a marked 
contrast to the common non-commitment twenty years ago. 
Compared with school and mass media, parents are the 
most significant socializing agent on the youngsters. The 
impact from school, especially the partisan ones, ranks 
second while mass media can only help in transmitting 
knowledge to the adolescents. 
Given the central position of parental influence upon 
the adolescents, it is not easy for the ruling authorities 
to conduct any systematic political education or political 
propaganda through educational institutions and media 
organizations among the youth in Hong Kong. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Despite the Chinese government's repeated promises of 
maintaining the status quo of Hong Kong for another 50 
years after 1997, people are still fully aware of the 
coining gradual or even drastic changes, once the Sino-
British Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong was 
signed in 1984. The anticipation of changes have already 
led to an annual exodus of about 4 0,000 to 50,000 Hong Kong 
people. 
However, it is crystal clear that the vast majority , 
or 90 per cent of Hong Kong citizens cannot secure a 
foreign passport. It is inevitable for these people to 
face a new political authority irrespective of their will 
when the British Crown Colony is due for return to China in 
1997. 
� This is especially true among the adolescents, aged 
between 13 to 18, who are still economically dependent on 
their parents. Their lack of financial resources and 
skills, which are valuable assets to apply for emigration, 
have left them without any choices. 
By 1997, this group of young people will turn 20 to 25 
and begin to step into society. Their political attitudes 
toward the new authority will become crucial to the 
governability of the future Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region. It is thus worthwhile to gauge the 
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adolescents * political dispositions toward China at present 
which may shed light on their behaviours in future. 
Although it is not unusual for a mature individual to 
change their values acquired early in life, this research 
just attempts to explore the youngsters‘ political 
orientation toward their mother country, as well as their 
main sources of influence which include parents, schools, 
mass media and peers. 
Since 1940s, especially during late 1940s and early 
1950s, there was a continuous influx of Chinese immigrants 
into Hong Kong to escape from Second World War or the 
communist rule. These inflows of Chinese refugees made the 
populations of Hong Kong swell from about 500,000 in 1945 
to 1,800,000 in 1947, and to 2,424,700 in 1953 (Lau,1982). 
No matter what had brought these people to settle in 
Hong Kong, this illustrated the fact that they would rather 
be ruled by a colonial government than the Chinese 
authority. Doubtless to say, the bulk of these refugees 
would not hold very favourable or even hostile attitudes 
toward China and may have transmitted these values to their 
younger generation. 
On the other hand, the 1997 issues had led the local 
mass media, especially those profit-oriented media 
organizations, to spare part of their local concern for the 
relationship between China, Britain and Hong Kong as the 
Sino-British negotiations began in 1982. Such frequent 
reporting on the Sino-British relationship should, in a 
certain way, have helped in shaping a child's image of 
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China. 
Meanwhile, the special status of Hong Kong has made it 
an arena for both Chinese Communist Party and Kuomintang to 
advocate their ideas. Therefore, the local press spread 
over a leftist-centrist-rightist spectrum according to 
their relationships with either party. However, Chan and 
Lee (1989) have found that there was a shift in the press 
editorials stance toward supporting the People‘s Republic 
of China's reign over the territory after 1997 among 
centrist and mainstream-rightist newspapers on the heels of 
the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Only 
with the exception of Hong Kong Times which is an ultra-
rightist newspaper, the rest of the press have already 
conformed to support China's rule in the near future. 
Schooling is always considered as a useful tool for 
governments to imbue all sorts of desirable values to the 
young. The typical colonial education system in the 
territory has successfully distanced the Chinese students 
from their mother country through monitoring the syllabuses 
of public examinations in a merit—oriented society. 
Take the syllabuses of the Hong Kong Certificate of 
Examination (HKEA, 1989) which is a must for all to attain 
a recognition of their secondary school education as an 
example. It is found that only two unpopular subjects, 
Economics and Public Affairs, and Government and Public 
Affairs, have slightly touched upon the political system of 
the People»s Republic of China, while the more popular 
Chinese History has ended the story of China at the time of 
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communist takeover. 
In addition to its neglect over Contemporary China, 
the legislation against the spread of political, subversive 
or tendentious activities in schools and amongst teachers 
and pupils has made the discussion of politics a taboo in 
school. Critics have strongly blamed the government for 
the fosterage of apolitical students. 
Facing with all these competing values and ideas from 
different sources of influence, it becomes interesting to 
find out the attitudes most adolescents have adopted and 




Most attempts to define political socialization have 
generally agreed that it is a process in which individuals 
incorporate into their own attitudinal structure and 
behaviour patterns the ways of their respective social 
groups and society. Langton (1969) has defined it as "the 
process, mediated through various agencies of society, by 
which an individual learns politically relevant attitudinal 
dispositions and behaviour patterns. these agencies 
include such environmental categories as the family, peer 
group, school, adult organizations, and the mass media.“ 
Following this trend of thought, researches are done 
through two different perspectives. One focuses on 
delineating the actual process involved in the 
socialization of an individual, whereas the other tries to 
spell out the behaviour pattern thus acquired and merge it 
with the political theories. 
These two approaches, though appear to be 
complementary, in fact the latter guides the direction and 
substance of researches in the former. While bearing in 
mind a certain interpretation with respect to the political 
system of a particular society, researchers tend to focus 
their eyes in the seemingly more appropriate behaviours or 
attitudes to be explored as a result of political 
socialization. These findings, if turn out to match with 
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previous theorization, would in return support the 
researchers' view toward the political system. Therefore, 
the researhes done within the context of delineating the 
process of political socialization are entirely fallen well 
within the framework in viewing political socialization as 
playing a vital role in society. 
This is especially obvious in the early studies done 
by Easton and Dennis (1969) . As noted by Cook (1985) , "the 
first studies were so preoccupied with presenting a 
coherent Apolitical theory of political socialization‘ 
(Easton and Dennis, 1969) that they sidestepped 
psychological theories of the learning process, sometimes 
explicitly•“ Such preoccupation, indeed, has limited the 
overall applicability of Easton and Dennis丨5 findings in 
other societies with dissimilar political system. 
Micro-approach to Political Socialization 
The first approach, which indeed describes 
socialization process in general, is developed along three 
perspectives: learning, personality, and role. 
All three approaches, according to Langton (1969), 
have basically assumed that an individual acquires 
behavioural predispositions in the course of social 
interaction, and that such social patterns are not likely 
to be acquired and reinforced unless they are in some way 
gratifying. 
Learning, which has received wider attention among the 
three, is a broad term applying to all behaviour which 
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derives from training procedures (Hilgard, 1960)• Many 
learning theorists view behaviour in terms of measurable 
stimuli and responses and attempt to determine the 
principles by which they are linked. This linkage is 
usually explained by the concepts of conditioning and 
reinforcement. 
Imitation and identification are two important 
concepts in explaining socialization as a result of 
learning process. A young child may form the habit of 
imitating the people upon whom he is dependent in order to 
gratify his needs. Through proper reward and punishment, 
a child may acquired patterns of desirable behaviours seen 
by his guardians. 
To identify is one step further which implies the 
child's intention to be another person. Some psychologists 
believe that the youngster identifies first with the person 
who gratifies his needs, others believe that he identifies 
with the person whose status he envies and who withholds 
from him the thing he wants (Kagan, 1958) • The child 
usually begins to identify with his parents, and proceeds 
to take other referents for his behaviour: peers, teachers, 
and work group members during his maturity. 
Turning to personality and role approaches, these two 
competing theories have rooted their conflict in the 
relative influence of personality versus role in orienting 
behaviour. Personality theory proponents suggests that an 
individual‘s character looms large in determining his 
behaviour in a certain situation. But role theorists 
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inclines to see individual behaviour as regulated by socio— 
cultural ideas of appropriateness. 
The focal point of the core argument between these two 
approaches just appears to be a matter of emphasis. 
Neither approach can explain all the behaviours observed 
among people with different characters playing various 
roles in numerous social context. It may be role-playing 
in a strictly formal situation and character-acting in 
another casual occasion. 
More importantly, both approaches cannot rule out the 
fact that these behaviours which may either be role-playing 
or character-acting are somehow originated from learning. 
The child learns from the elderly the appropriate 
behaviours in all situations. Hence, learning is seen to 
be more fundamental before proceeding onwards to discuss on 
the conflict between role and personality. 
As the focus of this research is to assess the 
relative influence of different agents of socialization 
upon an adolescent's acquisition of political orientation 
toward China, learning approach, which stresses more on the 
agents and individual relationship, is thus adopted. 
Hence, the research design would centre on the 
relationships between the students and their sources of 
influence rather than the presentation of various social 
occasion and seek for the subjects‘ likely response as is 
directed by either the role or personality approach. 
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Macro-approach to Political Socialization 
Although the delineation of the process of political 
socialization have received overwhelmingly prominent 
attention compared with locating the position of political 
socialization in the political system, it is still 
interesting to mention the ideas involved in it. 
Merelman (1986) has synthesized all the attempts to 
employ existing socialization research to help illuminate 
four of the "grand theories" of politics: systems theory, 
hegemonic theory, pluralist theory, and conflict theory. 
Systems theory, which is strongly proposed by David 
Easton (1965), emerges from the functionalist tradition in 
sociology (Buckley, 1967)• It presents a picture of 
socialization in which responsible, benevolent, but 
authoritative political leaders and their loyal subjects 
are central actors. By imposing positive attitudes toward 
authority among the youth as a result of political 
socialization, there emerges a political system with high 
levels of diffuse support. 
As for the hegemonic model, its dominant actors are 
capitalist owners of consciousness—formation industries and 
their political allies, on the one hand, and a latently 
resentful subordinate class on the other. Socialization 
agencies under state control — schools, the mass media, 
advertising -- are instrumental for teaching such economic 
values as "consumerism" and for creating young people who 
reject any economic system other than capitalism and are 
immediately hostile to attacks on the political status quo. 
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In the pluralist model, the dominant actors are 
interest groups and political parties who command the 
conditional support of active citizens. The socialization 
process aims to create a participatory public jealous of 
its own prerogatives, anxious to participate in ways that 
permit dissent and choice but rejecting of extreme, 
destructive forms of mass participation. The primary 
agencies of socialization are schools, parents, the mass 
media and competing political organizations. 
Finally, the conflict models describes cohesive groups 
locked in enduring, inescapable struggle. While a group or 
stratum may temporarily rule, its hold is always 
precarious. What holds the fragile fabric of society 
together under these conditions of constant struggle is 
intragroup loyalty, brought about in part through 
socialization. The dominant agencies of socialization are 
group-based propaganda organs, such as newspapers, focused 
setting, such as neighborhoods, and organizations 
representative of group interests. In addition, parents 
and schools are organized so as to transmit a strong sense 
of group loyalty. The main purpose of socialization is the 
creation of young people loyal to their group and willing 
to support it against others on a daily basis• 
Political Orientations 
To tap the adolescents' attitudes toward China, the 
concept of China is expanded according to Easton's 
classification of political system. He suggests a three-
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tier classification of political phenomena toward which 
political socialization is directed, including the 
government, regime, and political community. Government 
includes those authorities who are the day-to-day occupants 
of the more important political decision-making roles in 
society. Regime refers to the rules of the political game 
which legitimate and determine the character of 
authoritative roles, as well as specify what is expected of 
citizens or subjects. Political community is something 
akin to shared national identity• 
In this research, the government, regime and political 
community will mean the Chinese government, the Chinese 
Socialist regime and Chinese identity respectively. 
On the other hand, the definition and classification 
of types of political orientation follow Parsons and Shils 
(Almond and Verba, 1963). "Orientation refers to the 
internalized aspects of objects and relationships. It 
includes 'cognitive orientation,, that is, knowledge of and 
belief about the political system, its roles and the 
incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs; 
•affective orientation,‘ of feelings about the political 
system, its roles, personnels, and performance, and 
•evaluational orientation,‘ the judgments and opinions 
about political objects that typically involve the 
combination of value standards and criteria with 
information and feelings.“ 
By combining the three aspects or orientations from 
Parsons and Shils, and Easton‘s classification of political 
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phenomena, a total of nine different types of attitudes are 
resulted. Having taken the feasibility of designing a 
meaningful item into consideration, five aspects: cognition 
in general; affection toward regime, and political 
community; and evaluation toward government officials, and 
regime; are examined. 
Sources of Influence 
Proceeding on to the sources of influence, one of the 
major attempts of this research is to assess the relative 
and differentiated contributions of various socializing 
agents. Among the four most commonly studied socializing 
agents: mass media, parents, school, and peers, it is 
believed that peers play a comparatively unimportant role 
in political socialization toward China. It is because 
most people can have hardly formulated a. view toward China 
during their adolescence, let alone their ability to 
advocate any ideas. Taking this into consideration, peer 
group influence will only -be studied as part of the 
socializing atmosphere in school. 
The following discussion will first focus on the 
influence from mass media, family, and school respectively. 
The relative effects from these three agents and other 
possible intervening variables will then be delineated. 
Mass Media 
Until the 1970s, most researchers did not consider the 
mass media as a potential agent of political socialization. 
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Those few studies which included mass media variables 
actually treated exposure to political content as a 
dependent index of socialization rather than a causal agent 
contributing to the political learning process. Chaffee et 
al. (1970) speculate that the basis for ignoring the media 
role was the classic research evidence which showed that 
mass communication had limited effects on adult voting 
behaviour. They argue that it is inappropriate to apply 
these principles to preadult socialization, when a young 
person is forming rather than defending political 
predispositions. 
Recent investigations indicate that the mass media may 
be an important factor in political socialization. Studies 
of children•s mass media usage patterns demonstrate a 
considerable amount of exposure to politically relevant 
information, especially in older age groups (Lyle and 
Hoffman, 1972; McLeod et al•, 1972; Hawkins et al•, 1975; 
Schramm et al., 1961). 
To examine the consequences of mass media exposure, 
Chaffee et al. administered questionnaires to 1,300 
adolescents in both May and November of the 1968 
presidential campaign. They found that public affairs 
media exposure was correlated moderately with level of 
political knowledge and with campaigning activity at each 
point in time. Examining cross-lagged correlations across 
the six-month period, they discovered that public affairs 
media use in May correlated +.33 with November political 
knowledge and +.24 with November campaign activity. The 
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knowledge correlation exceeded both the opposite time-order 
relationship and a "baseline" figure representing chance 
association, indicating a causal influence. However, the 
evidence for impact on campaign activity was somewhat less 
conclusive. 
Hawkins et al. (1975) reported that preadolescents who 
were heavy users of the mass media for political 
information in the 1972 campaign displayed substantially 
greater knowledge about Watergate the following spring, 
compared to less exposed respondents. In a study of upper 
elementary school students, Conway et al. (1975) showed 
that exposure to television news programming was moderately 
associated with perceptions of policy differences between 
political parties, awareness of the law-making process in 
government, and knowledge of governmental roles. 
Several research investigations feature self-report 
perceptions of the role of the mass media versus other 
socialization agencies. Dominick (1972) administered 
questionnaires to junior high school students in New York 
City. The mass media were the primary sources of 
information about the president (83 per cent), vice-
president (85 per cent) , Congress (59 per cent) , and the 
Supreme Court (50 per cent). In each case, television was 
cited most often. In three similar surveys, junior and 
senior high school students were asked to identify their 
sources of information about foreign affairs and war. 
Across a variety of specific topics, more than half of the 
respondents relied primarily on the mass media, 
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particularly television. 
Exposure to television news may also stimulate the 
child to discuss news events with his peers and parents, or 
anticipated conversation about news topics may lead the 
child to seek out news shows in order to subsequently 
transmit or discuss the key stories. Schramm et al. (1961) 
discovered that sixth-graders in a town that was served by 
television tended to discuss the news twice as often as 
those in a town that had no television reception. Sixth-
and tenth-graders highly exposed to media public affairs 
content were more likely to participate in family political 
discussion, according to a survey by Roberts et al.(1975). 
Atkin (1972) found that high school students in an 
experimental condition where they anticipated discussing 
national current events were more heavily exposed to 
television news than students who did not expect such 
discussions. 
A study of high school students found a strong 
relationship between broadcast news exposure and political 
interest (Johnson, 1973). Research with adult voters 
further suggests that television news produces increased 
interest in political affairs (Atkin et al. 1976). 
However, the impact of television viewing on the 
child Is political knowledge and attitudes is quite 
different. In a survey among 196 seven-graders in U.S., 
Rubin (1976) found that those children who had indicated 
higher levels of television viewing exhibited lower levels 
of political information. More importantly, those children 
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who had indicated higher levels of television exposure 
displayed more negative attitudes toward political objects 
and institutions• It is because parents offer the child a 
rather stable, consistent, over-idealized view of the 
society and a positive, uncritical conception of political 
authority. The mass media, on the other hand, do not avoid 
presentation of a less idealized conception of the workings 
of power, influence, competing interests within the 
society, and, in general, the very fact that conflict is 
endemic to the political system. 
Family 
Scholars of personality development and human 
behaviour frequently regard the family as the most 
important agent of socialization, a unique context in which 
children acquire values and behavioural patterns. The 
child is to mirror his parents on a wide variety of social 
and political values. Hyman (1959), in a general review of 
the empirical research related to the transmission of 
political attitudes (pre-1960) states that, "over a great 
many such (family-child correspondence) correlations from 
the different studies, the median value approximates .5." 
Hyman‘s interpretation turns out to be very influential and 
gives birth to a belief on the significance of family in 
political socialization. 
In 1962, Hess and Torney conducted a survey among 
approximately 12,000 children in elementary grades two 
through eight in one large and one small city of each major 
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region of the United States. Their assessment on the 
accumulated effect of family in transmitting attitudes was 
done by comparing responses of a child with his sibling and 
an unrelated child matched on relevant characteristics. 
They have outlined three possible means of family 
influence. 
First, parents transmit attitudes which they consider 
valuable for the child to hold. The transmission process 
may take the form of direct impartation or discussion. The 
attitudes to be transmitted are a mixture of values 
reflecting community consensus, or representing differences 
of opinion existing within the community, or just 
idiosyncratic attitudes without reference to any division 
within the community. 
Second, the family also presents examples that 
children may emulate or identify. The most prominent 
example so far is party affiliation. Many studies 
(Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954； Hyman, 1959; Maccoby, 
Matthews, and Morton, 1954) conclude that children follow 
the party preference of their parents are affiliated with 
the same party. Besides, children may become politically 
active if their parents are active. Children may learn to 
value modes of political involvement which they observe in 
their parents. 
A third possibility is that expectations formed from 
experience in family relationships are later generalized to 
political objects. The home provides the child's first and 
most lasting experience with interaction in a hierarchic 
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social system. Through this experience, children develop 
relationships, expectations, and behaviour patterns. A 
child becomes attached to the family unit through 
attachment to its individual members, relates to the 
hierarchy of authority and learns compliance to its 
regulations, thus establishing a frame of reference for 
approaching systems he will later encounter. 
In Hess and Torney»s study on the development of 
relationships between the individual and the institutions 
rather than the acquisition of traits or opinions, they 
come to conclude that "the family transmits its own 
particular values in relatively few areas of political 
socialization and that, for the most part, the impact of 
the family is felt only as one of several socialization 
agents and institutions." They see the primary influence 
of the family as the agent which promotes early attachment 
to country and government, and which thus "issues the 
stability of basic institutions." Hence, "the family's 
primary effect is to support consensually-held attitudes 
rather than to inculcate idiosyncratic attitudes.“ The 
major exception to these conclusions occurs in the area of 
partisanship and related matters where the family's impact 
is predictably high. 
In Jennings and Niemi (1968) study done in 1965 on the 
flow of certain political values from parent to child, 
which includes party identification, opinions on specific 
issues, evaluation of socio-political groupings and 
political cynicism, the results also echo with those of 
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Hess and Torney. 
Among the four items, only the "transmission of party 
preferences from one generation to the next is carried out 
rather successfully in the American context.” On the 
opinions on specific issues which is one way to express 
one's political values, it is found that "the articulation 
of political opinions is only moderately strong on salient, 
concrete issues and virtually nil on more abstract issues•“ 
With respect to the evaluation of socio-political 
groupings, Jennings and Niemi notice an extraordinarily 
congruent patterns of ratings between parents and students 
as two separate groups but an extremely low correlation 
between individual pair of parents and student. Even for 
political cynicism which is a fundamental orientation 
toward political actors and activity and should be formed 
early in life, the parents and child correlation is still 
extremely low. 
In exploring the effect of homogeneous and 
heterogeneous parents on passing on of attitudes, Jennings 
and Niemi (1974) have noticed that parents holding alike 
opinions can reproduce their attitudes in their offsprings. 
The larger correlations found between students and 
homogeneous parents than that between students and single 
parent give further impetus to the importance of 
homogeneous parents in formulating the students‘ opinion. 
But the impact of alike parents is not without limits. It 
only flowers when the parents» view fall into the majority 
in the political culture showing that the parental 
19 
香 浪 中 文 大 舉 f t ] • 你 城 i T 
influence is subject to other forces at present. 
In addition to direct transmission of political 
attitudes from parents to child, Jennings and Niemi tried 
to assess the characteristics of family structure which may 
affect the transmission of political attitudes. 
They hypothesize that the closer the student felt to 
his parents the more susceptible he would be to adopting, 
either through formal or informal learning, the political 
values of the parents. But this turned out to be untrue. 
On the power relationships between parents and child, the 
hypothesis that the more "democratic" and permissive these 
relationships were the greater congruency there would be 
has found support. Moreover, the level of family 
politicization affects somewhat the flow of party 
identification and cynicism but is unrelated to the 
transmission of other values. 
In view of these conflicting results, Connell (1972) 
reviewed the related research from 1930 to 1965 in an 
attempt to clarify the picture. His conclusions highly 
downgraded the relevancy of family upon political 
socialization, and instead he opted for sociological 
explanations of the patterns of mass belief. 
To establish his point, Connell first made a 
distinction between "pair" correspondence between 
individual parents and the child, and "group" 
correspondence in the sense of a similar distribution of 
opinions in each generation, regardless of the standing of 
each child with respect to his own parents. 
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He then attributed Hyman‘s (1959) misleading 
interpretation to a misconstruction of Remmers and 
Weltman's (1944) data by mistaking group correspondence as 
pair correspondence. 
Connell goes on to examine other studies and describes 
the common pattern of findings as one of low pair 
correspondence but high group correspondence between the 
opinions of parents and children. Besides, all the 
findings have not given strong proof to anything about the 
processes within families. Connell concludes that older 
and younger generations have developed their opinions in 
parallel rather than in series, by similar experiences in 
a common way life. 
Wrightsman (1970) has also highlighted the possibility 
that the common environment being exposed to by both 
parents and child may be one factor causing a high 
congruence in intergenerational attitudes. His study on 
children * s responses to threat of war has shown great 
similarity between parents' and children's attitudes. He 
explains such congruence by noting that "the commonality 
between parents‘ and children丨s attitudes is due not only 
to the direct inculcation of the child by his parents 一一 
but also, probably, due to indirect influences, such as the 
newspapers allowed in the home, the television news 
commentators the parents choose to have the family watch, 
and the adult-age friends who visit the family. Thus, in 
effect, the parents 'manage the news‘ unconsciously by 
exposing the child to a selected type of attitudes.” 
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In spite of the findings against the salience of 
family in political socialization, Langton * s (1969) study 
has come up with another interesting observation. In his 
analysis of the political socialization of Jamaican and 
American secondary school students, he examined the 
relative influence of mother and father in directly 
transmitting their political orientations to their 
offspring. Contrary to the prevailing view of the 
political dominance of the father, the influential player 
turns out to be the mother. In case if the mother is 
relatively more politicized or educated than the father, 
triadic homogeneity is maintained more often than when the 
opposite prevails. 
Apart from direct transmission of political attitudes, 
socioeconomic status which is in concomitant with family 
does play a part in shaping a child * s view. 
Hess and Torney have suggested that the socioeconomic 
status of a family together with the structure of family 
power would also influence the child * s relationship to the 
systems and attitudes. 
In mediating class differences in personality and 
attitudes, Hess and Torney find that children from high 
status families see their fathers as more powerful in the 
family and as more instrumental teachers of citizen 
attitudes than do lower status children. Moreover, 
children from homes of lower and middle social status 
viewed their parents as less interested in government and 
current events than did children from higher status home. 
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These findings indicate differences in the home 
atmosphere in different social classes, particularly in the 
perceived political involvement and interest of the parents 
and the perception of the father's authority. Children of 
lower social status also tend to be oriented toward the 
school as the agent of citizenship training, rather than 
toward the home. 
Hess and Torney conclude that the differences in 
family structure which are characteristic of the various 
classes may be one of the most important mediators of 
differences between socioeconomic groups. Children who see 
their fathers as powerful tend to be more informed and 
interested in political matters. Children who rated their 
fathers low and family interest low tended to give more 
•Don't Know' responses. That is, they had acquired fewer 
political attitudes. 
Instead of probing the attitudes directly from the 
parents, this research attempts to get the adolescents' 
perceived parental attitudes. This may avoid the sampling 
bias of collecting responses from parents with similar 
traits, such as those who are closer with the children are • ‘ 
moire willing to answer the questionnaire requested by their 
children. 
School 
The second major agent of socialization examined in 
the research literature has been the school. According to 
Hess and Torney (1967), the elementary school plays a 
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crucial role in teaching conceptions, beliefs, and 
attitudes about the operation of the political system. 
However, Langton (1969) reports compelling evidence that 
formal "civics" training in the secondary school has a 
minimal impact on most socialization indices. He explains 
by noting that most adolescents have almost formulated 
their view toward politics by the time they enter the 
secondary school, and thus the lessons taught in the civic 
classes are just redundant information to the young. 
Development in the Study of Political Socialization 
In reviewing the literatures in political 
socialization, it is noticed that the subdiscipline has 
started in the late 1950s and reached a climax in the early 
1960s which see the flourishing studies on the impact of 
parents and schools as agents of socialization. 
Right at the time when many researchers have 
marginally vacated the field in the late 1970s, Chaffee et 
a l� ( 1 9 7 0 ) breath-breaking declaration on the importance 
of mass media as potential agents in influencing the 
students have drawn another flood of studies from .• 
communication researchers and can be viewed as a 
continuation of the socialization study. But the 
enthusiasm from the communication researchers also dies out 
in early 80s. 
Cook (1985) notes that a lack of theoretical 
confidence has been the root cause leading to a bearish 
market in the study of political socialization. He points 
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out that nobody has dared to deny the importance of 
political socialization as a subject. The bear market thus 
resulted can be attributable to methodological problems and 
the absence of a clear rationale based in psychological 
models of development for study. 
Cook sees the use of questionnaires to tap political 
attitudes has prompted the students to give socially 
approved answers, and the lack of a base on psychological 
models has led the researchers to easily conclude that 
political socialization is not an important area at the 
wake of few life-long persistent attitudes thus found. 
Based upon his evaluations, he suggests research 
methods such as participant observations, experiements, and 
Q-sorts, and the applicability of psychological model to 
meet future challenges in this fertile area. 
Given the dampened climate in the studies on political 
socialization. Cook's suggestions appear to be 
illuminating. But his propositions are not without limits. 
Although the use of survey really tends to limit the 
possible choices open to the subjects, participant 
observations, experiments, and Q-sorts are not devoid of 
cultural bias and other practical problems. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Social Context in Hong Kong 
Aside from family or parent-child relationship, the 
influence from the political culture, the education system, 
and the structure of the mass media are other features to 
be explored in this research. This chapter serves to 
outline the important characteristics of the territory 
which are related to this study. 
Political Culture 
In the absence of an authority leader who is actively 
seeking support from the mass and strong political parties 
constantly competing for ruling power, the political 
structure described by hegemonic theory may be most 
representative of Hong Kong society, but yet with some 
qualifications. 
While schools, mass media and advertising are 
instrumental for the ruling party in those political system 
described as hegemonic, the colonial education system, a . 
large Government Information Service which serves to 
disseminate information and arrange press conference for 
media organizations, and the consumerism promoted by 
advertising are indeed comparable counterparts in Hong Kong 
to the hegemonic institutions just mentioned. 
The second thing which is particular for this research 
is that it intends to assess the adolescents‘ orientations 
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toward their future government instead of the present 
ruling authority of Hong Kong. Yet the future Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region government may sound alien to 
the adolescents. The ultimate ruling force to be -- the 
Chinese government -- is by no means a stranger to the 
young. 
Throughout British colonial rule in the territory, 
China is a potential competing authority to claim for 
ruling legitimacy. In order to cling to its ruling power, 
the Hong Kong government has tried to prevent its people 
from closely identifying with China which may mean a threat 
against the British colonial rule. Coupled with the fact 
that various people in Hong Kong are refugees from economic 
hardship or political turmoil in China, many Hong Kong 
Chinese are either apolitical or half-hearted toward their 
mother country. 
The government‘s laissez-faire economic policy has 
successfully led to a tremendous advancement in local 
economy. But this has produced influential business 
community which advocates consumerism among others. All 
these match the hegemonic model. •, 
Given the colonial status of the territory, the Hong 
Kong citizens are expected to be distant from China and 
share unfavourable attitudes toward the Beijing government. 
Political Orientations 
To tap the adolescents' attitudes toward China, the 
concept of China is expanded according to Easton's 
27 
classification of political system. He suggests a three— 
tier classification of political phenomena toward which 
political socialization is directed, including the 
government, regime, and political community. Government 
includes those authorities who are the day-to-day occupants 
of the more important political decision-making roles in 
society. Regime refers to the rules of the political game 
which legitimate and determine the character of 
authoritative roles, as well as specify what is expected of 
citizens or subjects. Political community is something 
akin to shared national identity. 
In this research, the government, regime and political 
community will mean the Chinese government, the Chinese 
Socialist regime and Chinese identity respectively. 
On the other hand, the definition and classification 
of types of political orientation follow Parsons and Shils 
(Almond and Verba, 1963). "Orientation refers to the 
internalized aspects of objects an 1 relationships. It 
includes »cognitive orientation,» that is, knowledge of and 
belief about the political system, its roles and the 
incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs； ., 
•affective orientation,‘ of feelings about the political 
system, its roles, personnels, and performance, and 
•evaluational orientation,丨 the judgments and opinions 
about political objects that typically involve the 
combination of value standards and criteria with 
information and feelings.” 
By combining the three aspects or orientation from 
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Parsons and Shils, and Easton's classification of political 
phenomena, political attitudes toward China are measured in 
terms of knowledge about Contemporary China; affection 
toward regime, and political community; and evaluation 
toward government officials, and regime. 
Structure of Mass Media 
There are more than 60 daily newspapers, nearly 600 
periodicals, two private television companies, one 
government radio-television station, one commercial radio 
station, and one radio service for the British Forces (Hong 
Kong Yearbook, 1989)• 
Hong Kong‘s flourishing free press consists of 63 
newspapers and 598 periodicals, which have a high 
readership. The registered newspapers include 47 Chinese-
language dailies and two English-language dailies. Of the 
Chinese-language dailies, 40 cover mainly general news, 
both local and overseas, while the others cover solely 
entertainment, especially television and cinema, and horse-
racing news, and two concentrate on finance. 
Since most of the older generation Chinese .' 
newspapermen came to Hong Kong to escape political turmoil 
on the mainland, psychologically they were refugees and 
were ready to move back to China once that became possible. 
In the past few decades, the pro-communists and pro-
Kuoraintangs continued their feuding, through newspaper 
columns. Hong Kong became a battlefield of ideas and 
ideologies. The Chinese newspapers were mainly interested 
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in events in China and slighted public and social affairs 
in Hong Kong. Furthermore, their refugee mentality also 
persuaded them to stay out of local controversies and not 
to upset the Hong Kong authorities• 
It was only until the 1970s did "centrist" newspapers, 
loyal to Hong Kong and critical of both Beijing and Taipei, 
began to prosper. These profit-motivated commercial papers 
are beneficiaries of Hong Kong»s rapidly expanding economy 
and its formidable advertising industry and are quick to 
capture the reading taste of the mass. While devoting 
significant coverage to Chinese politics, these papers 
appear to focus more on local issues and the immediate 
concerns of Hong Kong citizens at large. It is not in 
their interest to identify too closely with either outside 
party. 
According to Lee and Chan (1989), newspaper dailies in 
Hong Kong fall into four categories of political ideology 
or party-affiliations: ultra—leftist, centrist, mainstream 
rightist and ultra—rightist, with respect to their sources 
of financial support and party-linkage, place of 
registration, choice of national day celebration and •, 
calendar, and ways of addressing the Beijing regime and the 
Taipei regime. A probe in the 18 more widely read Chinese 
newspapers reveals that five are ultra-leftist, eight are 
centrist, four are mainstream rightist, and only one is 
ultra-rightist. 
The circulation of the five ultra-leftist papers: Ta 
Kung Pao, Wen Wei Pao, New Evening Post, Ching Po, and the 
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Hong Kong Commercial Daily, are relatively low. One of the 
reasons accounting for their low readership is their biased 
reporting, especially on sensitive political issues. On 
any important but controversial subject, these papers tend 
to ignore or play down the oppositions' views such as the 
case throughout the Sino-British negotiations (Lau, 1986)• 
Although there are many people in the territory who 
are hostile to communism, the only ultra-rightist paper ~ 
Hong Kong Times -- has failed to capture the market. One 
reason put forward for its lack of success is that the 
paper has failed to change with the times. Many Hong Kong 
people may be anti-communist, but the policies of China are 
changing, and this affects the attitude of the Hong Kong 
public. Some critics of the Hong Kong Times say that it 
has stuck to an anti-communist policy simply for the sake 
of it, without objectively examining changing 
circumstances. Hence, it cannot catch up with readers• 
changing expectations (Lau, 1986)• 
In addition to newspapers, the political stance of the 
Chinese-language political magazines also exhibit similar 
patterns as found among the newspapers. Nevertheless, the . • 
circulation of these magazines is extremely low in Hong 
Kong market. 
Education System 
In Hong Kong, the most salient feature of its 
education system is the breeding of a small group of 
educated elite to fill up the high ranking positions in 
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government and big corporations, with a mass public to 
cater the needs of the industrialists. 
Such purpose is achieved through a scarce supply of 
university places among a large number of graduates from 
grammar schools. Recently, the government has speeded up 
the increase in the number of places in higher education 
institutions, but still only about 10.4 per cent 
(statistics at Sept 1989) of the secondary school graduates 
are fortunate enough to be granted a place in these 
institutions. 
By drawing similar examples from history, Myrdal 
(1968) noted that the colonial government and the 
indigenous privileged groups were normally interdependent. 
The privileged class relied on the colonial government to 
maintain law and order to keep prosperity in society, 
whereas the government could gain wider support with the 
influence of this class. Reaping the benefits from the 
colonial rule, the privileged few would opt for the 
continuation of the existing rule instead of any drastic 
social reforms. And this is exactly what the government is 
looking for from this supportive and influential class. . • 
To spread the British culture among Hong Kong people, 
the usage of English as a medium of instruction among an 
overwhelming majority of Chinese students is an effective 
tool. The government promotes the learning of English 
indirectly by adopting English as the official language, 
and making English Usage a compulsory subject in the 
entrance examination of the University of Hong Kong. This 
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automatically enhances the establishment of more English 
secondary schools together with a decline in Chinese middle 
schools. Nowadays, there are 28 Chinese secondary schools 
still remaining in the territory out of a total of 431 
secondary schools. 
In addition to the importance given to English 
language, the neglect on Chinese language and Chinese 
History also play a part in distancing Chinese students 
from their mother country. Moreover, the government also 
highly downgrades the significance of civic education in 
the formal curriculum in the secondary schools in order not 
to turn out a politically active mass. The guideline on 
civic education published by the Education Department in 
1985 in the light of the democratic reforms has only 
suggested the teaching of civic education through a hidden 
curriculum. The fact that the subjects on public affairs 
are neither pragmatic in a commercial society nor 
compulsory in the public examination render them to become 
a rare choice among secondary schools. Under these 
circumstances, students turn out to be ignorant both in 
China, especially Contemporary China, and Hong Kong public ., 
affairs. 
The secondary schools in Hong Kong can be classified 
into three types according to their modes of finance: 
government, subsidized, and private schools. since the 
government puts low priority on general education, it has 
to rely on other voluntary bodies to provide education, 
resulting in a majority of subsidized schools dominated by 
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three religious groups: Catholic Church, Sheng Kung Hui 
(ProteGtant Church), and Chinese Christian Church. The 
remaining subsidized schools are organized by other 
religious bodies, voluntary agencies and business chambers. 
It is obvious that these voluntary bodies aim to breed 
students who support the status quo. 
Among the dominating religious groups of secondary 
schools, there exist a small community of famous schools. 
These schools, which normally cater to the need of the 
upper class, have a longer history in the territory and are 
especially renowned in teaching proficient English. The 
principals from these schools are not only influential in 
their respective religious coirmiunities, but also members of 
government's consultative coinmittees on education. In 
order to maintain their prestigious status, these famous 
schools are loyal proponents of elitist education, or the 
colonial education system. 
On the financial aspects of schools, both government 
and subsidized schools are publicly financed: the former 
are totally financed and directly adininistere:d by the 
government; the latter are run by voluntary bodies, which . 
normally contribute about one-fifth of the capital costs. 
Private schools are further sub-divided into private non-
profit-making schools and private independent schools. 
Nowadays, only a few private non-profit-making schools are 
left which receive a limited amount of recurrent: aid from 
the government. Most private schools are run as profit-
making institutions and the government does not meet any 
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part of their capital or recurrent costs, although it buys 
some of their places which may be an importance source of 
fund for the schools. 
Judging on the basis of source of finance, it is 
apparent that government schools are directly under the 
influence of the ruling authority whose power then 
decreases along with lesser funding in subsidized and 
private schools. 
Although it is the ideal of some of the founders of 
private schools to provide an alternative to colonial 
education, the general lack of fund and the motive of 
profit-taking have left most private schools providing less 
than satisfactory education. 
The exceptions come from private schools which have 
close connections with either the Chinese Communist Party 
(the leftist) or the Nationalist Party (the rightist)• 
Today, there are altogether seven private non-profit-
making schools having close ties with the Chinese Communist 
Party. These schools stick to their Chinese curriculum 
amidst a decline in Chinese middle schools. Owing to their 
special ties, they were once against the British colonial • 
rule during the height of the Chinese Cultural Revolution 
in 1967. To combat the colonial education system, students 
from these schools did not take part in the public 
examinations organized by the government for secondary 
school leavers. Their graduates were normally absorbed by 
the Chinese organizations in Hong Kong. With the fading 
out of ultra-leftist rule in China and a sense to adapt to 
35 
Hong Kong society, these schools have shifted toward the 
mainstreanu 
On the other hand, the number of schools forming close 
ties with the Nationalist Party is about 13. Contrary to 
their communist counterpart, these schools are more willing 
to accept government subsidy. A total of eight out of 13 
schoolG are subsidized while the rest are private schools 
with government buying places. This also implies that 
their individual direct or indirect relationships with the 
Nationalist Party differ widely among themselves. These 
schools and the 14 Taiwan connected private tertiary 
colleges which provide matriculation classes are generally 
stepping stones for students to study in Taiwan 
universities. 
The leftist or rightist schools normally promote the 
sense of Chinese nationality and an interest in current 
affairs by reading Chinese newspapers advocating their 
respective party lines. For most other schools, the 
principals normally do not promote any strong interest in 
public affairs. Nevertheless, it is possible that some 
teachers may try to do this on their own. • 
In the eyes of the pro-Kuomintang people, they see 
themselves as Chinese which are originated from the piece 
of land now occupied by comnunist party and still adhere 
strongly to the Chinese culture before the communist 
takeover. As it is the communist party which has forced 
the Kuomintang to settle in Taiwan Island, the communists 
are no doubt their enemy. Therefore, comparing with the 
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centrists, the rightists are more patriotic with stronger 
Chinese identity. 
Relative Influence and Interaction among Agents 
Aside from imparting its own values onto the 
adolescents directly, all three socializing agents may 
interact with one another. 
Past researches (Hyman, 1959) show that family 
occupies the central position in socialization. It is 
apparent that political socialization is no exception. 
Barring parents' direct influence upon the child 
throughout his upbringing, the child's exposure to mass 
media is likely determined by parents, including switching 
onto the parents‘ favourite television channel, tuning to 
the parents• favourite radio station, buying a particular 
newspaper or political magazine. Normally, people's choice 
of newspapers and political magazines corresponds with 
their own political orientations. The child's habitual 
exposure to his parents‘ favourite newspaper may help in 
transmitting the parental attitudes to the offsprings. 
Although the students in Hong Kong are subject to a . 
central place allocation system which takes the students‘ 
academic performance and living district into consideration 
in their progression from primary to secondary schools, the 
parents' preference is crucial in the final decision. 
Some parents, especially those who are related to 
either the Chinese Communist Party or Kuomintang, would 
normally send their children to the respective partisan 
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schools which are mostly private and have greater 
discretion on the choice of students. These students would 
then be taught to learn about the respective party lines of 
their parents through the more systematic teaching or 
informal atmosphere in school. 
Likewise, the partisan schools would instruct their 
students to read the respective partisan press as a form of 
civic or political education. This enhances the 
transmission of political orientations from school to 
students. 
Therefore, it is obvious that parents command the 
central position in shaping the child's political 
predisposition by choosing the desirable newspapers, 
political magazines and school. 
But with the high popularity of television in Hong 
Kong, both parents and children are subject to the same 
influence. This is especially important for those students 
who come from partisan families and schools and are exposed 
to partisan press. In this respect, television news serves 
to provide different angles of viewing social events. By 
the same token, the parents are also subject to the impact . 
of television news, or television programs in general. , 
Bearing all these in mind, it is interesting to really 
compare the effect from different agents. It is presumed 
that family plays the most significant role in political 
socialization. But for school and mass media, no 




A survey with a self—administered qu‘2stionnaire is 
conducted to collect the data in April 1990. The subjects 
of this research are F.4 students, who are at their mid-
adolescence between 15 and 16 years old, in Hong Kong. 
According to the Hong Kong Government information, there 
are altogether 366,732 students studying in secondary 
grammar school (at Sept 1989) with 73,561 F.4 students 
(including technical and prevocational school). 
Sampling 
There are altogether 431 secondary schools in Hong 
Kong. Counting on the basis of the mode of finance with 
respect to the Hong Kong Government, there are 4 0 
government schools, 309 subsidized schools and 82 private 
schools by registration. Judging from the connection with 
either the Chinese Communist Party or Kuomintang in terms 
of having direct subsidy from bodies related to them, there . 
are 7 leftist schools, 13 rightist schools, and 411 
centrist schools. 
As the total number of partisan schools is barely 20 
which is almost negligible in comparison with the 411 
strong non-partisan schools, one can hardly contrast the 
partisan with the non-partisan subjects in a sample with 
reasonable size of about 400 to 500 respondents. 
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But since school type and school partisanship are two 
important criteria guiding the school's attitude toward 
China, it is contemplated that two samples -- one which 
corresponds to the ratio of partisan schools to non-
partisan schools as well as the ratio of government and 
subsidized schools to private schools and another one which 
consists of substantial number of subjects from both 
partisan and non-partisan schools can be created from 
the subjects being surveyed. 
Though it is hoped that the first sample produced can 
match well with both the ratio of government, subsidized, 
and private schools and the ratio of rightist, centrist and 
leftist schools, it must be clarified that the ratio of 
partisan to non-partisan schools is more important as any 
oversampling on the students from partisan schools may 
skewed the results toward those expected of partisan 
schools. 
In view of the school authorities• generally low 
response rate to request for conducting survey in school 
which is usually found in previous research, and the 
special requirements of having enough students from . 
partisan schools, accidental sampling is used to look for 
subjects to be studied. 
To start with, the size of the first sample which is 
named as "representative sample" in this research in spite 
of its non-probabilistic nature is designed to be around 
450 to 500 students. The size of the other sample which is 
termed as "special sample" can be anything larger than 
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that. 
In drawing the sample among the centrist schools, a 
list of schools with possible contact of a teacher who can 
act as a mediator is prepared and the appropriate schools 
with regard to its mode of finance are then chosen. All 
the schools, mainly the non-partisan ones are reclassified 
into government, subsidized and private and a 
representative sample is then drawn. Occasionally, some 
school principals are contacted directly to form the 
expected sample. 
To exemplify the variations found among students from 
partisan and non-partisan schools, additional number of 
subjects is drawn from partisan schools so as to compose 
the second sample which would consist of approximately 
equal number of students from leftist, rightist and 
centrist schools. This is achieved by stratifying the 
population into centrist, leftist and rightist schools. 
Owing to the relatively small number of partisan schools, 
the school principals are reached directly until a sample 
with reasonable size and comparable number of students from 
partisan schools has been formed. . 
Though this method of drawing a sample is spontaneous, 
it is easier to secure a high response rate from the school 
authorities. 
The total number of schools being surveyed is 17, and 
the number of questionnaires distributed is 975. However, 
3 0 answered questionnaires from a rightist school, which is 
Rennie丨s Mill Middle School in Rennie»s Mill -- a living 
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area for retired Kuomintang soldiers after Second World 
War, are all considered as invalid. This school is known 
as a very typical rightist school which organizes the 
celebration on Taiwan's National Day for the other rightist 
schools in Rennie‘s Mill. Besides, the matriculation class 
in this school is recognized as a stepping stone for 
further study in Taiwan. 
The questionnaires have been conducted in class in 
Rennie,s Mill Middle School without the help from the 
researcher as requested by the school principal. But it 
turns out that all respondents give identical responses for 
the student‘s attitudes, the student's perceived parental 
attitudes, the newspapers and political magazines being 
read and the background of the student»s grandparents which 
are all typical of a rightist respondent. It is suspected 
that the subjects have picked the choice under the strict 
guidance of the school. In order to avoid bias in the 
findings, these questionnaires are taken to be invalid. 
In most other schools, the questionnaires are either 
conducted under the guidance of the mediator whom has been 
instructed on the procedures, or the researcher as is the • 
case in partisan schools. in general, the students are 
quite cooperative in answering the questionnaires. 
The number of valid questionnaires collected is 883 
with a response rate of 90.56 per cent. Seventy-four are 
from government, 426 from subsidized and 383 from private 
schools. Meanwhile, 235 are from rightist, 453 from 
centrist and 195 from leftist schools (Table 4.1 and 4.2). 
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Table 4.1 
Schools under research 
N咖e Type Partisan- Teaching 
ship Medium 
Pui Kiu Private Leftist Chinese 
Heung To Private Leftist Chinese 
Mongkok Workers‘ Private Leftist Chinese 
Children 
T�i Tung Private Rightist Chinese 
Ming Yuen Subsidized Rightist Chinese 
Queen Maud Subsidized Rightist Chinese 
St Louis Private Centrist English 
Old Boys‘ 
Maria College Private Centrist English 
Seaward Woo Subsidized Centrist English 
Leung Kau Kui Subsidized Centrist English 
Diocesan Boys丨 Subsidized Centrist English 
St Paul Subsidized Centrist English 
Prevocational 
Tai Hung Subsidized Centrist English 
S-C.Gaw Memorial Subsidized Centrist English 
Homantin Govt Government Centrist Chinese 
Queen Elizabeth Government Centrist English 
Table 4.2 Distribution of students in schools under research 
Name No. of students No. of students 
in the in the 
special sample representative sample 
Pui Kiu 74 4 
Heung To 49 2 
Mongkok Workers» Children 72 4 
Tai Tung 69 6 
Ming Yuen 93 ^ 
Queen Maud 73 6 
St Louis Old Boys丨 91 91 
Maria College 28 28 
Seaward Woo 3 2 3 2 
Leung Kau Kui 79 
Diocesan Boys丨 37 37 
St Paul Prevocational 31 31 
Tai Hung 37 3 7 
S.C.Gaw Memorial 44 44 
Homantin Govt 37 37 
Queen Elizabeth ？7 巧 
883 482 
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The special sample which includes all the subjects 
would be used to reveal the differences found between 
rightist, centrist and leftist schools. 
In order to obtain the representative sample, the 
special sample is weighted by including all the 453 
subjects from centrist schools and adding the respective 
number of students from rightist and leftist schools 
according to their ratio in the population which is 
1:44.3:1.8 for leftist, centrist and rightist students. 
The distribution of the two samples according to type of 
school (Table 4.3) and partisanship (Table 4.4) is shown as 
follows. 
Table 4.3 
Distribution by school type 
School type No. of students No. of students 
in representative in special 
sample sample 
Government 74 74 
Subsidized 273 426 
Private 134 383 
482 883 
Table 4.4 
Distribution by school partisanship 
Partisanship No. of students No. of students 
in representative in special 
sample sample 
Rightist 19 2 3 5 
Centrist 453 453 




This research is going to test the following 
hypotheses by using either the representative sample or the 
special sample. 
In order to explore the effect of media exposure in 
general, the following hypotheses are tested with the 
representative sample so as to gain insight into the 
situation found in the population: 
1. Higher news exposure correlates with higher political 
knowledge, higher* interest in China affairs, and more 
frequent discussion with parents, teachers and peers on 
China affairs; 
2. Higher television entertainment exposure correlates with 
lower cognition, and less favourable attitudes toward 
China. 
On the effect of partisan press, the special sample is 
used to test the following hypotheses: 
3. Readers of partisan newspapers are more knowledgeable in 
China, demonstrate stronger patriotism and Chinese identity 
than readers of centrist papers, while readers of rightist 
press have the worst evaluation of Beijing officials and 
Socialist regime. 
On the effect of family on the students, the following 
hypotheses are tested by using the representative sample: 
4. The possibility that the students share similar 
attitudes with their parents is greater than chance, with 
greater student-mother congruence, and larger student-
parents correlations for homogeneous parents; 
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5. The closer student-parents relationship, the more 
democratic the parents, and the higher the level of family 
politicization are, the more likely is the student to adopt 
his parental attitudes; 
6. Students from higher status home tend to have greater 
correlations with their parents, perceived greater parental 
influence, see their parents as more interested in China 
affairs and have a stronger personal interest in China 
affairs than students from lower status home. 
With respect to the impact from type of school, it is 
examined by employing the representative sample on the 
following hypothesis: 
7. Students from government and famous schools possess less 
favourable attitudes, are less knowledgeable toward China, 
have fewer discussion and smaller interest on China affairs 
than students from subsidized and private schools. 
Regarding the effect of teaching medium, the special 
sample is used to test for the following hypothesis: 
8. Students from English secondary school show less 
favourable attitudes, are less knowledgeable toward China 
and have smaller interest on China affairs than Chinese •, 
schools. , 
In relation to the effect of school partisanship, the 
following hypotheses are tested by adopting the special 
sample: 
9. Students from partisan school display stronger 
patriotism and Chinese identity than non-partisan school, 
while students from rightist school have the poorest 
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evaluation of Beijing officials and Chinese Socialist 
regime； 
10• Students from partisan school are more knowledgeable, 
more interested in China politics, and have more discussion 
on China affairs than non-partisan school. 
In assessing the relative impact of various agents on 
the students, statistical analyses are done on both samples 
in order to contrast the differences between students in 
general and students in partisan school in particular. 
Variables and Measurement 
The self-administered questionnaire which is conducted 
during April, 1990, comprised of five parts: student»s 
attitudes toward China; student‘s perception of parental 
attitudes; student»s relationship with parents, teachers 
and peers; student‘s media usage habit; and finally, the 
student‘s personal data. 
In this study, student‘s attitudes toward China are 
the dependent variables, whereas the media usage habit, 
parental attitudes, school type and partisanship are the 
main independent variables. The likely intervening or 
conditional variables are: student's interest in China 
affairs, and student-parents relationship. other 
independent or control variables include: sex; birth place; 
group of study which refers to the school subjects chosen 
by the students: arts, science, technical and commercial; 
socioeconomic status; China-visited for Hong Kong-born 
students; and length of residence in Hong Kong for China-
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born individuals. 
In exploring the attitudes toward China, a total of 13 
attitude items and nine questions are devised which cover 
affection toward regime, and political community; and 
evaluation toward government officials, and regime; and 
cognition in general. Since it is difficult to draw a 
clearcut division between the concepts of affection and 
evaluation, as well as between regime and political 
community, the final attitude items come up with a mixture 
of meanings. Out of these 13 items, 10 are set with a six-
point Likert scale� which ask the respondents to indicate 
how much he agrees or disagrees to these statements. 
Regarding the affection toward political cominunity, 
the items are: "I love China", "I am willing to devote 
myself to China", and another question asking for the 
identity of the student with three options: Chinese, Hong 
Kong people, and others. 
With respect to evaluation toward government 
officials, the statements are: "The communist Chinese 
government has governed China very well", "Most communist 
Chinese government officials are upright, only a few 
corrupt". The statements -- "Merits outnumber demerits 
throughout Communist China regime in the past few decades", 
and "The communist Chinese government can govern better in 
the near future" strive to explore the subject's opinion on 
the performance of the Chinese officials in the past and 
^The .Likert scale is: very agree, quite agree, sliqhtlv 
agree, slightly disagree, quite disagree, very disagree. 
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his projection in future. Another question asks the 
subject to indicate his level of trust toward China both 
before and after the pro-democracy movement in Beijing in 
June 1989 on a six—point Likert scale. Besides, an 
attitude item stating "The Chinese authorities have not 
taken Hong Kong people's interest into consideration in 
drafting the Basic Law" intends to seek for the student‘s 
evaluation on officials with particular reference to the 
way they are dealing with the territory. 
On the evaluation toward regime, the item is "Nothing 
is meritorious in Chinese Socialist regime". 
The statement: "I support the Chinese Communist Party" 
attempts to tap for the student‘s feeling toward both the 
government officials and Socialist regime. On the other 
hand, the item: "If it had been the Taiwanese government 
ruling China, it would have done better than the communist 
Chinese government" also aspires to measure for the 
subject's evaluation of government officials and Socialist 
regime in comparison with Taiwan. 
The question which asks the student ‘ s to give his 
preference on the outcome of the problem of the future of • 
Hong Kong with three choices: independent, ruled by the 
British government and revert to China can be considered as 
a complex item exploring the respondent's feeling toward 
China in general. 
To avoid student‘s picking the scale point on the same 
side and any suggestion from the researcher, the items are 
stated both in positive and negative direction. 
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Student's cognition is measured by a total of nine 
questions intended to cover both general and specific 
knowledge of China.^ 
With respect to media usage habit, the student is 
asked to indicate the average number of hours watching 
television in general, television news program, television 
public affairs program; listening to radio broadcasting in 
general, radio news broadcasting, radio public affairs 
program; reading newspaper on a normal school day. 
Moreover, he is requested to give the time he usually 
spends on reading magazines in general and political 
magazines in particular during a week. 
Since it is difficult to ask the respondent to 
indicate the time reading a particular news page, the 
frequency^ of his reading the local news page, 
international news page, China news page, commentary page 
and editorial are asked instead. Besides, the respondent 
is requested to name the newspaper(s) in decreasing order 
of reading frequency. 
On the habit of reading magazines, the student is also 
asked to name the political magazine (s) in decreasing order •' 
of reading frequency. 
^The questions are: who is the chairman of PRC? Who is the 
fhief Secretary of CCP? What is the foundation year of PRC? Who 
if the director of China News Agency — Hong Kong Branch? Who is 
the president in Taiwan? What is the foundation date of TaiwarP 
W h�t IS the legislative body in PRC? What are the four 
principles? What is the Three Principles of the Peoples? 
了The frequency ranges from always, sometimes, seldom to never. ‘ 
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Media exposure is computed by suimning the total time 
spent on the above four media per day. In figuring out the 
news exposure, the time of reading newspaper per day is 
adjusted by timing it with a factor which is calculated by 
dividing the summation of the frequency of reading local 
news page, international news page, China news page, 
commentary page and editorial by 20 一  the maximum 
frequency. This adjustment is done in order to avoid 
including the time students spent on reading non-news 
pages. News exposure is then estimated by totalling the 
adjusted time on reading newspaper, the time reading 
political magazine, the time exposing to news and public 
affairs programs on electronic media. 
In particular, the variable of television 
entertainment exposure is computed by subtracting the news 
and public affairs programs exposure from total television 
exposure. Besides, the variables of China news exposure is 
simply the respondent‘s frequency of reading China news 
page. 
On computing the media partisanship which measures the 
political orientation of the respondent‘s exposed media, “ 
all newspapers and political magazines are assigned a 
number ranging from 1 to 5 in the order of increasing 
leftist orientation/ Media partisanship is computed by 
dividing the summation of individual media partisanship of 
all newspapers and political magazines the respondent read 
„ . leftist orientations are: i： "ultra-rightist" 2-
"rightist", 3: "centrist", 4: "leftist", 5: "ultra-lefSt". 
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by the respective number of publications. 
Regarding the parental attitudes, the student is asked 
to indicate his perception of the opinion of his father and 
mother respectively to the same attitude items. In order 
to avoid respondent from producing the same results as his 
own, the three sets of items are arranged in different 
order. The parental attitude on a particular item is just 
a summation of either parent‘s choice. On the homogeneity 
of parental attitudes, it is reckoned simply by subtracting 
the choice of one parent from the other. 
To explore the student‘s relationship with his 
parents, a series of questions ask the respondent to 
indicate separately his personal relationship with his 
father and mother. These include closeness, dependence, 
caring, discipline and allowance on expression of opinion 
and acceptance level. Out of these items, the variable of 
closeness which is a summation of both parents» level of 
closeness with the child, and the variable of family 
democratic environment which is a summation on the items of 
allowance on expression of opinion and acceptance level are 
computed. -, 
The respondent is also requested to indicate his level 
of interest in China affairs, his parental interest in 
China affairs, his frequency of discussing China affairs 
with his teachers, parents, and peers. Besides, he has to 
indicate his perceived influence from mass media, parents, 
schools and peers. 
Family politicization which is a summation of both 
52 
parents' level of interest in China affairs and level of 
awareness to China news is computed to measure for the 
parental interest in China politics. 
Furthermore, the variable of frequency of discussion 
with parents on China politics is computed by aggregating 
the subject's frequencies of discussion with either parent. 
Socio-economic status is judged by a summation of the 
following variables: father's occupation, mother's 
occupation, father's education, mother's education, house 
type, and perceived socio-economic status. Family income 
which is in fact a good indicator of socio-economic status 
is omitted here because 44.19 per cent of the respondents 
give "don't know" answer to this question. 
Regarding school, the variable 一一 school atmosphere on 
discussing China affairs 一一 is computed by summing the 
frequencies of teachers discussing China affairs with 
students and discussion among peers in school, and the 
frequencies of the respondent‘s participation in the above 
discussion. 
Statistical Analysis 
In gauging the influence from mass media on shaping 
the respondent‘s attitudes, their attitudes are correlated 
with media exposure, news exposure, television 
entertainment exposure, and China news exposure by using 
the representative sample. 
To investigate the effect of partisan press on the 
students, the student»s attitudes are correlated with media 
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exposure, news exposure, and media partisanship ty using 
the special sample. 
On the influence from parents, the student»s al titudes 
are correlated with the parental attitudes. 
To further delineate the effect of other intervening 
or conditional variables on the effect of parents oji child, 
student-parents correlations are broken down according to 
the following variables: closeness, democratic envi)onment, 
family politicization, parents» homogeneity, socio—(iconomic 
status, sex, China-interest, China-visited, length of 
residence, group of study, and birth place. 
Regarding the effect of schools, student‘s altitudes 
are correlated with school type and school atmosphere in 
the representative sample in accordance with node of 
finance which is expected to reflect the situatioi in the 
population. 
To contrast the effect of partisan schools from non-
partisan schools, the student•s attitudes are correlated 
with school partisanship in the special sample. The 
correlations between student's attitudes and school 
atmosphere are also computed. •. 
Among all the variables, media exposure, news 
exposure, television entertainment exposure, and cognition 
are interval variables while the rest are ordinal 
variables. Therefore, Kendall's tau-b or tau-c is computed 
for the correlation between two ordinal variables. since 
Pearson Is product moment correlation which is supposed to 
be restricted for correlations between interval variables 
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is more advanced and sophisticated than Kendall»s tau-b or 
tau—c, it is calculated instead for correlations between 
interval and ordinal variables. For correlations between 
two interval variables, Pearson's product moment 
correlations are calculated. 
As it is perceived that both partisan readers and 
partisan schools students may exhibit strong affection but 
poor evaluation toward China, a special design with two 
statistical analyses involving different arrangement of 
school and press partisanship are done. 
In the first analysis, the media or/and partisanship 
is/are arranged in the ascending order of rightist, 
centrist, and leftist, whereas in the second analysis, the 
media or/and partisanship is/are arranged in the order of 
centrist, rightist and leftist. It is contemplated that 
the first analysis may help reveal the poor evaluation of 
the rightist, while the second one may disclose the strong 
affection of the rightist. These differences are to be 
discovered by calculating Kendall's tau-c which would show 
the direction of correlation. 
Political socialization is by no means a direct ., 
process between agent and child. It is highly possible 
that the agents are inter-related. 
To work in this direction, the student-parents 
correlations are controlled by school type in the 
representative sample and by school partisanship and media 
partisanship separately in the special sample. Moreover, 
interaction between media and school would also be 
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discovered by doing similar control. 
The relative influence of different sources is also 
another focus of this study. This is examined by employing 
the stepwise regression analysis in the SPSS-X. 
By using stepwise regression analysis, the relative 
imp 3rtance of all independent variables against one 
dependent variable can be determined. Nevertheless, the 
statistical rule of restricting regression analysis for 
interval variables is relaxed here as most of the variables 
und 3r study are indeed ordinal. 
To avoid running the analysis with weak independent 
variables and highly inter-correlated independent 
variables, the correlations between the dependent variables 
(attitude items) and independent variables (agents) are 
sorted out in the first place. 
The more important and lowly intercorrelated 
independent variables are then chosen to be the independent 
variables in the stepwise regression analysis. The beta 
weight and multiple correlation of the independent 
variables with respect to the attitude items are computed 
in Che stepwise regression analysis. Simple comparison on .' 
the beta weight and the independent variables, order of 
ent'sring in the stepwise regression analysis may 
dein‘)nstrate the relative influence of these variables. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Findings I: Sample Characteristics 
Since two samples -- representative and special -- are 
needed to undergo the necessary statistical analyses in 
this research, the biographic data or general 
characteristics -- sex, age, birth place, group of study, 
China—visited, length of stay 一 一 of these two samples are 
described in the first place. Given the central position 
of the representative sample, its other features, 
especially on the distribution of attributes on different 
variables are then outlined. 
General Characteristics of Two Samples 
On the distribution of gender (Table 5.1), only 43.1 
per cent of the subjects are male in the representative 
sample, whereas 49.9 per cent of them are male in the 
special sample. 
Table 5.1 
Percentage distribution by sex 
Sex Representative Special 
sample sample 
N=473 N=873 
Male 43.1 49.9 
Female 56.9 50-l 
100.0 100.0 
Regarding the age distribution (Table 5.2), the 
representative sample includes students ranging from 14 to 
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19 whereas the special sample is composed of subjects 
ranging from 14 to 20. Nevertheless, both samples have 
students whose ages are concentrated at 15 and 16. 
Table 5.2 
Percentage distribution by age 
Age Representative Special 
sample sample 
N=47 6 N=869 
14 3.6 3.7 
15 39.0 29.3 
16 37.1 34.5 
17 14.8 22.0 
18 4.9 8.7 
19 .5 1.4 
20 0 . 2 
21 0 .1 
100.0 100.0 
With respect to the distribution of birth place (Table 
5.3), the majority of the students are born Hong Kong in 
both samples, while most parents are born in China (see 
Appendix 1 and 2)• 
Table 5.3 Percentage distribution by birth place 
Birth place Representative Special 
sample sample 
N=472 N=873 
China 17.4 27.1 
Hong Kong 81.8 71[6 
Others .7 ^！2 
100.0 100.0 
On the distribution of group of study (Table 5.4), the 
number of subjects studying in arts classes (34.8 per cent) 
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almost equals to that of science classes (33.6 per cent) in 
the representative sample. But it is necessary to point 
out that the number of respondents studying in commercial 
classes (28.5 per cent) in the representative sample should 
have been over-represented though the actual distribution 
in the population is lacking. However, it is assumed that 
it would not lead to a biased result to a great extent. 
Table 5.4 
Percentage distribution by group of study 
Group Representative Special 
sample sample 
N=474 N=864 
Arts 34.8 32.5 
Science 33.6 4 3 . 1 
Technical 2.7 1.5 -
Commercial 28.5 22.9 
100.0 100.0 
In either sample (Table 5.5), the percentage of 
locally born students having been to China is about 60 per 
cent, showing that quite a number of the students have been 
to Mainland China. 
Table 5.5 
Percentage distribution of China-visitors 
for Hong Kong born students 
China-visit Representative Special 
sample sample 
N=383 N=613 
Yes 62.4 64.1 
No 37.6 35.9 
100.0 100.0 
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For the China immigrants in the representative sample 
(Table 5.6), their length of residence in the territory 
vary from 1 to 18 years with concentrations at 7 years 
(10.4 per cent) , 8 years (15.3 per cent) , lo years (18.6 
per cent) and 11 years (14.0 per cent). 
Table 5.6 
Percentage distribution by length of residence 
for China-born students 
Year Representative Special 
sample sample 
N=83 N=235 
^ 2.2 6.8 
2 1.5 10.2 
] -8 5.5 -
t 1.0 6.0 
, .7 3.8 
^ 5.1 3.4 
7 10.4 7 2 
• 15.3 10:2 
9.1 6.8 
18.6 14.9 
。 14.0 7.7 
4.1 3.4 
〒】 5.1 3.0 
〒》 1-7 2.6 二 6.3 3.8 
“ 2.6 2.1 
“ 2.1 
1.2 .4 •、 
100.0 100.0 
comparison between Representative Sample and Population 
The information given by the Education Department 
shows there are a total of 436,428 students enroling in 
secondary schools and matriculation classes. Judging from 
the data of all secondary schools provided in the Handbook 
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of Hong Kong Education (Information Centre of Jiong Kong 
Education, 1989), the number of students studying in 
leftist schools is estimated to be 9,261 whereas the number 
registering in rightist schools is 17,000• Therefore, the 
ratio of students studying in leftist, centrist, and 
rightist schools is 1 to 44.3 to 1.8. 
The size of the representative sample which is 
weighted to reflect the distribution of partisan schools 
among centrist schools in the population is 482, with 10 
subjects from leftist schools, 453 from centrist and 19 
from rightist. 
According to the statistics from Education Department 
in Sept 1989, there are altogether 73,561 pupils studying 
in form four. The weighted sample thus constitutes .66 per 
cent of the population. 
Judging from another parameter which is the type of 
school with respect to mode of finance, the ratio of 
government and subsidized schools to private schools is 
2.59 to 1 in the sample which is quite close to the 
government statistics of 2.63 to 1. Although the age of 
the students span from 14 to 19 in the sample, the majority . • 
are either 15 or 16 years old which fall within the age 
group of students studying form 4. However, the ratio of 
male to female students in the sample is 1 to 1,32 which 
deviates to a certain extent from the 1 to 1.06 ratio among 
students from 15 to 17 years old as given by government at 
Sept 1988. 
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Media Usage Habit 
For all the variables being constructed in this study, 
the students' distribution in them are briefly described as 
follows with respect to mass media, family and school for 
the representative sample. 
Among the 482 subjects in this sample, the students 
spend an average of 3.14 hours on a normal school day 
watching television which included 33 minutes for news and 
28 minutes for public affairs program. 
In spite of the extremely deep penetration of 
television in the territory, seven students (1.45 per cent) 
report watching no television, 30 (6.22 per cent) relate 
watching no television news and 125 (25.93 per cent) say 
watching no television public affairs program. 
Students spend another 1.39 hours listening to radio 
broadcasting with 18 minutes on news and 7 minutes on 
current affairs program. And the number of students who do 
not listen to radio broadcasting, radio news, and radio 
public affairs program are 121 (25.10 per cent), 161 (33.40 
per cent) and 354 (73.44 per cent) raspectively. 
On reading habit, these students spare 28 minutes a 
day reading newspapers, 14 minutes r€)ading magazines which 
included 2 minutes reading political magazines. In fact, 
12 3 (25.52 per cent) students say they do not read 
newspaper, but a slightly smaller number of 110 (22.82 per 
cent) students say they do not read magazines in general. 
However, the bulk of the students -- 399 (82.78 per cent) -
“say they do not read political mag.izines. 
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Comparing the length of exposure to different media, 
and the number of students who do not expose to that media, 
it is apparent that the most influential media is 
television. Even on the consumption of news, the number of 
students watching television news (452) is larger than the 
number reading newspaper (359), with an average of longer 
exposure time to television news. This shows that students 
rely heavily on television for both news and entertainment. 
Two variables: total media exposure and news exposure 
are constructed with the above figures. On the average, 
the total media exposure and news exposure per day which is 
a summation of time spending on television, radio, 
newspapers and magazines is 5.26 hours, while the news 
exposure per day which is a summation of time spending on 
news, public affairs programs and political magazines is 
1.89 hours. 
A recent survey publicized in May 1990 and conducted 
by Boys' and Girls丨 Clubs Association of Hong Kong on 2,700 
students aged between 10 and 15, from primary four to form 
three levels, in 72 schools showed that the children spent 
an average of 2.21 hours a day watching television, out of . 
an average of 4.51 hours of leisure tiine\ 
The students in this research reported an average of 
3.14 hours a day watching television. It is one hour 
longer though the students under research are at form four 
and are supposed to have spent more time on homework. 
The total media exposure of 5.26 hours is even longer 
^South China Morning Post, May 26, 1990. 
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than the reported 4.51 hours of leisure time by the 
students surveyed by Boys' and Girls' Clubs Association 
sounds incredible. It is thus likely that these form four 
students under study have over-estimated their time spent 
on media. 
One reason to account for this is the relatively small 
living environment in Hong Kong. Most families have to 
crowd together in a small room and conduct all the home 
activities in the same place. It is highly possible that 
students watch television or listen to the radio 
broadcasting while they are engaging in other activities: 
revising their lessons or having their dinner. 
This is also the case as reported by the survey done 
by the Boys' and Girls, Association. About 60 per cent of 
the respondents say they watch the television while having 
dinner and over 50 per cent report that they are doing 
their homework while watching television. 
This suggests that the form four students under study 
may not pay full attention to television or radio 
broadcasting in spite of their relatively long exposure. 
Or, they may have simply mistaken the number of hours the . 
television or radio is on at home during their stay there 
as time of exposure which should mean hours with attentive 
watching or listening. 
On the other hand, the distribution of readership 
among the students is akin to the overall readership in 
Hong Kong market. The order of widely read newspapers 
among the subjects is: Oriental Daily News, Sing Pao, Tin 
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Tin Daily News and Ming Pao. And these papers are all 
classified as centrist press in Hong Kong. Oriental Daily 
News, Sing Pao and Tin Tin Daily News are good at covering 
spot news, movie stars, horse-racing and sensational news, 
whereas Ming Pao concentrates more on politics and China to 
suit the taste of students and intellectuals. 
Such similarity of readership is natural as most 
students indicate their reasons for the choice of 
newspapers as "bought by family". 
On the most popular political magazines, the 
respondents indicate Next and Asiaweek 一一 Chinese edition. 
Next is a newly established magazine launched in mid-March 
1990. It covers interest topics from politics, economics, 
life-style, film stars and gossips. Its soft presentation 
on news stories tends to cater for leisure reading and thus 
it is understandable on its popularity among the form four 
students. 
Most students pick "recommended by teachers" as their 
reason of reading Asiaweek -- Chinese edition, since it is 
the only international magazine published in Chinese, it 
suits the need of those students who have a lure for 
international affairs. 
Out of the five frequencies of reading different news 
pages, only the variable of China news exposure is 
constructed by simply using the frequency as an indicator. 
Nevertheless, it is revealing to compare the students' 
exposure to different news pages. 
Forty-one per cent of the students indicate that they 
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"sometimes" read the China news page, and 37.1 say they 
"seldom" read China news page (Table 5.7). 
Matching with their frequency of reading other news 
page, 51.2 per cent of the students say they "always" read 
the local news page, 50.7 per cent say they，sometimes" 
read the international news page, 40.9 per cant of the 
respondents say they "sometimes" read the commeitary page, 
and 51.2 per cent of the subjects say they "sc^ldom" read 
the editorial. This shows that the students place higher 
priority on local and international news page than China 
news page. 
Table 5.7 
Percentage distribution by frequency c f 
reading different news pages 
Frequency China Local Inter- Commentary Editorial 
national 
N=3 64 N=3 67 N=3 65 N=359 N=3 61 
Never 5.5 .3 2.5 5.5 22 2 
Seldom 37.1 11.4 29.9 37.1 51.2 
Sometimes 40.9 37.1 50.7 40 9 19.7 
Always 16.5 51.2 16.9 16:5 6:9 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Family Characteristics 
Closeness, democratic environment ard family 
politicization are the three features to be explored on 
their effect on the transmission of attitudes from parents 
to child in this study. 
Closeness is constructed simply by asking the student 
to indicate his degree of closeness with both pcrents. On 
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the closeness with father (Table 5.8), 33.3 per cent of the 
students say they are "slightly close" to their fathers 
while another 23.7 per cent indicate that they are "quite 
close" to their fathers, showing that students enjoy 
closeness with their fathers. 
The respondents even manifest greater closeness with 
mothers. Twenty-five per cent of the subjects think they 
are "slightly close" with their mothers, 37.4 per cent say 
they are "quite close" with their mothers, while 24.3 per 
cent indicate that they are "very close" to their mothers. 
This is consistent with most findings that children 
normally have closer relationship with their mothers. 
Together with the findings on closeness with father, most 
respondents seem to enjoy close relationship with their 
parents. 
Table 5.8 
Percentage distribution by students• 
degree of closeness with parents 
Degree Father Mother 
N=4 68 N=473 
Very distant 4 . 7 2.6 
Quite distant 6.3 2 •• 6 
Slightly distant 20.7 8 •• 3 
Slightly close 33.3 24!9 
Quite close 23.7 37 4 
Very close 11.4 2 4 . ' 3 
100.0 100.0 
Democratic environment at home is constructed by the 
students' response to two questions in relation to their 
degree of expressing opinion and being accepted by their 
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parents. 
In response to the question of "Do your parents allow 
you to express your opinion on your own personal matters 
(e.g. choosing friends and school, participating in extra-
curricular activities) throughout your upbringing?" (Table 
5.9), most students (37.6 per cent) pick "a]ways do" which 
is point 5 on a 6-point Likert scale, while the rest are 
concentrated on the high end of the scale. 
For another question which asks: "Would your parents 
accept your opinion?", the bulk (79.4 per cent) of the 
respondents indicate their choice at point 4 or point 5. 
This means that the students have seen themselves enjoying 
freedom at home. 
Table 5.9 Percentage distribution by students' (degree of 
expression & acceptance 
Degree Expression Acceptance 
N=481 N=4 66 
Never 2 . 7 .7 
Always don't 9.2 3[3 
Average don't 8 . 2 12•4 
Average do 22.4 40!0 
Always do 37.6 3 9 . 4 
From time to time 19.9 3[g 
100.0 100.0 
With respect to family politicization which measures 
for parental interest in China politics in terms of their 
interest in China politics and awareness of China news, 
38.5 per cent of the students see their fathers• interest 
level as "slightly interested", whereas 27.3 per cent of 
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the subjects say their fathers‘ interest level as "quite 
interested" (Table 5.10). In the case of mother, 36.2 per 
cont indicate their mothers丨 interest level as "slightly 
interested", while 24.6 per cent say their mothers are 
"slightly uninterested" in China affairs. 
Table 5.10 
Percentage distribution by parents• 
of interest on China affairs 
Interest level Father Mother Student 
N=469 N=47 5 N=47 9 
Very uninterested 4.0 8.0 4.6 
Quite uninterested 5.1 8.6 10.5 
Slightly uninterested 16.5 24.6 26.2 
Slightly interested 38.5 36.2 46.0 
Quite interested 27.3 18.5 10.8 
Very interested 8.3 4.2 1 . 9 
100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 
On the awareness of China news, 51.6 per cent of the 
respondents say their fathers are "always" aware of China 
news (Table 5.11), while 43.4 per cent of the students say 
their mothers are "sometimes" aware of China news. This 
shows that the students have recognised their fathers as 
having interest while their mothers as having 
unenthusiastic interest in China affairs. 
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Table 5.11 
Percentage distribution by parents" 
frequency of awareness of China news 
Frequency Father Mother 
N=471 N=477 
Never 2.4 5.2 
Seldom 8.6 22.0 
Sometimes 37.4 43.4 
Always 51.6 29.4 
100.0 100.0 
Apart from these three characteristics, the 
interparental homogeneity is computed to explore whether 
homogeneity found between parents is instrumental in 
•transmitting attitudes to offsprings. . 
The homogeneity of parental attitudes are divided into 
three categories: homogeneous (high), heterogeneity with 
difference in one scale point (medium), heterogeneity with 
more than one scale point (low)• Since there are only 
three choices for Chinese identity: Chinese, Hong Kong 
people, and others, it is divided into homogeneous(high) 
and heterogeneous (mediim). 
Statistics (Table 5.12) show that over forty per cent 
of the parents indeed share the same attitude with their 
spouse, and another 30 per cent holding attitudes which are 




Attitudes Low Viedium High 
(%) (%) (%) 
Evaluation of officials 14.7 35.3 50.0 
Evaluation of regime 26.4 30.2 43.5 
Trust 12.9 37.4 49.7 
Patriotism 18.4 37.7 43.9 
Chinese identity 16.7 83.3 
On top of all the above, the socio-economic status of 
the student is also computed. It is a summation of 
father's occupation, mother丨s occupation (Table 5.13), 
father's education level, mother‘s education level (Table 
5.14), house type of students (Table 5.15), and self-
perceived SES (Table 5.16). 
Table 5.13 
Percentage distribution by parents‘ 
occupation by status 
status Father Mother 
N=452 N=459 
High 27.5 9.6 
Medium 47.3 18.9 
Low 18.5 18.4 




Percentage distribution by 
parents“ education level 
Education Father Mother 
N=430 N=433 
Tertiary 9.7 5.1 
Secondary 42.1 34.6 
Primary & below 48.2 60.3 
100.0 100.0 
Table 5.15 
House type of students 
Type No. of students Percentage 
Public & others 219 46.5 . 
Hostel 10 2.1 
Private 242 51.4 
433 100.0 
Table 5.16 
Perceived SES of students 
SES No. of students Percentage 
Lower 136 29.0 
Middle 259 55.3 
Upper 74 15.7 
469 100.0 
A scan on these figures would notice that the parents‘ 
occupation are mostly medium level of employment, but with 
primary school education. Though the students are almost 
split equally between public and private housing, most of 
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them (55.3 per cent) see themselves belong to middle 
class. 
School Environment 
In constructing the variable of school atmosphere with 
respect to the discussion on China affairs, the respondent 
is asked to indicate the frequency of their school teachers 
in giving their opinions and initializing discussion on 
China politics in school, and the frequency of such 
discussion among the schoolmates. 
Results show (Table 5.17) that teachers "sometimes" 
(45.4 per cent) discuss China affairs with the students 
while the schoolmates "seldom" (50.9 per cent) talk about 
China politics. The summation of these two frequencies 
constitutes the variable of school atmosphere. 
Table 5.17 
Percentage distribution by frequency 
of teachers’ & schoolmates® discussion 
Frequency Teacher Schoolmates 
N=481 N=480 
Never 9.2 17.3 
Seldom 39.4 50.9 
Sometimes 45.4 29.2 
Always 6.0 2.6 
100.0 100.0 
Other Variables 
On the perception of influence from the socializing 
agents (Table 5.18), media is taken as the most influential 
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agent with most of the responses fall within the choices of 
"slightly large" (28.3 per cent), "quite large" (31.3 per 
cent), to "very large" (23.0 per cent), whereas peers is 
considered as the least influential. While father is seen 
as the second influential agent after the media, teachers 
come third. Mother is not considered as an important 
agent. 
Table 5.18 
Percentage distribution by degree of 
perceived influence from sources 
Degree Father Mother Teacher Media Peers 
N=462 N=4 66 N=4 69 N=47 5 N=4 69 
Very small 14.6 22.7 15.9 4.3 21.6 
Quite small 17.2 18.1 10.7 4.6 21.2 
Slightly small 17.6 22.6 19.7 8.5 27.9 
Slightly large 26.3 23.7 32.6 28.3 21.7 
Quite large 19.1 10.8 17.3 31.3 5.6 
Very large 5.3 2.2 3.8 23.0 2.0 
100. 0 100.0 100.0 100. 0 100.0 
Regarding the discussion on China affairs between the 
respondent and his source of influence, 41.2 per cent of 
the students indicate that they "seldom" discuss China 
affairs with their fathers (Table 5.19), and 45.5 per cent 
of the students pick the same response on the discussion 
〜dth mothers. Forty-three per cent of the students say 
they "seldom" discuss with their schoolmates. Their 
frequency of discussion with teacher is even lower, with 
44.9 per cent of the respondents chosen "never". 
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Table 5.19 
Percentage distribution by frequency of 
discussion with sources 
Frequency Father Mother Teachers Schoolmates 
N=470 N=47 6 N=469 N=479 
Never 18.5 21.3 44.9 20.5 
Seldom 41.2 45.5 42.2 42.8 
Sometimes 34.5 29.8 11.9 32.4 
Always 5.8 3.4 1.0 4.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Findings II: Attitudes Toward China 
Students‘ attitudes 
Given the central position of the students‘ attitudes 
toward China and the complexities involved in the concept 
of China, this chapter attempts to give a picture on the 
general orientations held by the students and contrast them 
with their perceived parental attitudes. 
The overall distribution of students‘ attitudes 
reflect a generally negative attitude toward China on a 
six-point Likert scale with the following options in an 
ascending order: very disagree, quite disagree, slightly 
disagree, slightly agree, quite agree, and very agree. 
Evaluative Orientations 
Generally speaking, the students have extremely poor 
evaluation on the performance of Beijing officials (Table 
6.1). The majority of the respondents (46.1 per cent) pick 
"very disagree" to the item: "The communist Chinese 
government has governed China very well", while another 
28.8 per cent of the subjects indicate their choice as 




Students® political attitudes toward China: 
frequency distribution in percentage^ 
Attitudes 1 2 3 4 5 6 0^ 
The communist Chinese 46.1 28.8 17.4 3.6 .0 1.5 2.5 
govt has governed 
China very well 
Most communist Chinese 50.1 24.7 15.0 3.7 1.9 1.0 3.7 
govt officials are upright, 
only a few corrupt 
Merits outnumber de- 19.0 16.5 27.9 14.5 4.2 2.5 15.4 
merits throughout 
Communist China regime 
in the past few decades 
The conmuinist Chinese 1.7 1.5 22.5 27.2 15.4 15.3 16.5 
govt can govern better 
in the near future 
Trust (post-June 4) 63.2 24.3 8.2 .8 .1 .7 2.7 
Trust (pre-June 4) 10.7 10.8 31.9 30.6 5.6 .9 9.4 
The Chinese authorities 3.6 2.7 13.7 30.2 19.3 20.0 10.6 
have not taken HK people‘s 
interest into consideration 
in drafting the Basic Law . 
Nothing is meritorious 3.1 4.0 37.8 21.4 13.4 11.5 8.8 
in Chinese Socialist 
regime 
工 support the CCP 61.9 13.8 8.4 2.8 1.0 1.4 10.8 
工 love China 8.9 3.8 14.5 40.4 12.9 8.4 11.2 
工 am willing to devote 7.0 3.1 11.9 33.5 20.0 7.5 17.0 
myself to China 
Chinese identity] 2.0 60.7 37.3 
Hong Kong future^ 36.6 46.2 7.6 9.6 
If it had been the 6.3 6.0 21.2 28.4 9.3 3.7 25.1 
Taiwanese govt ruling 
China, it would have 
done better than the 
communist Chinese govt 
Evidence on the students' low evaluation of the 
Beijing authorities can be shown on their extremely low 
^The sum of the percentage in each item is 100. 
^The numbers 1 to 6 indicate increasing favourable toward 
the statement whereas 0 represents no opinion. 
^1： others； 2: Hong Kong people; 3: Chinese 
independent,- 2: rule by the British government ； 3: 
revert to China 
77 
level of trust toward China government after June 4 
event. Sixty-three per cent say they "very distrust" the 
Chinese government after the crackdown in China, while 24.3 
per cent indicate their trust level as "quite distrust". 
Contrasting their trust level before the massacre in 
Beijing, 31.9 per cent pick "quite distrust" and 30.6 per 
cent take "slightly trust". This represents a significant 
decline in the students‘ trust toward the Beijing 
government. The suppression on the pro-democracy movement 
across the border is most probably the first brutal event 
these youngsters have witnessed through the mass media 
during 二Iieir upbringing. The negative impact is profound 
which in turn has led the students to put the performance 
of the Chinese officials in a remarkably bad light as is 
suggested by the close correlation of .42 between the 
statement of "The communist Chinese government has governed 
China very well" and "trust toward China" (Table 6.2)5. 
5ln working out the correlations, the Likert scale is 
reversed for items which have been phrased in a negative way so 
as to unit the direction of the scale for all items giving higher 
score on scale implies more favourable attitude. 
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Table 6.2 
Item-by-item correlations among students‘ attitudes 
Govern Corrupt Merit Better Trust Basic Regime CCP Love Devote I dent Future Taiwan Cognit 
Govern 1.00 .31* .34* .21* .A2* .15* .26* .25* .10* .10* .08* .07 .12* .02 
Corrupt 1.00 .21* .26* .26* .07 .14* .31* .02 .04 -.00 -.01 .07 -.04 
"en't 1.00 .27* .20* .08 .15* .20* .18* .16* .05 -.02 .08 -.00 
Better 1.00 .27* .13* .18* .28* .10* .05 .07 -.02 .12* -.03 
Trust 1.00 .27* .24* .36* .15* .00 .06 .09* .24* .04 
Basic 1.00 .41* .27* .08 .07 .08 .14* .15* .12* 
Regime 1.00 .17* .14* .12* .18* .10* .26* .05 
CCP 1.00 .12* .12* .08 .08 .21* -.03 
Love 1.00 .59* .38* .14* .10* .22* 
Devote 1.00 .31* .09 .01 .15* 
I dent 1.00 .19* .05 .21* 
Future 1.00 .01 .01 
Taiwan 1.00 .06 
Cognit 1.00 
Govern: The cominunist Chinese govt has governed China 
very well. 
Corrupt: Most communist Chinese govt officials are upright, 
only a few corrupt. 
Merit: Merits outnumber demerits throughout Communist 
China regime in the past few decades. 
Better: The communist Chinese govt can govern better in 
the near future. 
Trust: trust toward China 
Basic: The Chinese authorities have not taken HK people's 
interest into consideration in drafting the Basic 
Law. 
Regime: Nothing is merit^orious in Chinese Socialist 
regime. 
CCP: 工 support the CCP. Love: 工 love China. 
Devote: I am willing to devote myself to China. 
工dent: Chinese identity Future: Hong Kong future 
Taiwan: If it had been the Taiwanese govt ruling China,it 
would have done better than the communist Chinese 
govt • 
Cognit: ievel of cognition 
* p < .05 
One of the reasons causing the students to consider 
the Beijing officials as badly performed is due to the 
sweeping corruption in Mainland China. This is reflected 
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by the .31 correlation between the items 一 一 "The communist 
Chinese government has governed very well" and "Most 
communist Chinese government officials are upright, only a 
few corrupt". In response to the latter item, one-half of 
the subjects丨 take "very disagree", 24.7 per cent choose 
quite disagree" and 15 per cent say "slightly disagree". 
The subjects 丨 response to this statement is even more 
critical than the item —一 "The communist Chinese government 
has governed China very well", showing that the students 
see corruption almost as the most serious problem in China. 
Aside from associating these two assertions together, 
the students also direct their dissatisfaction toward 
Beijing officials to the Chinese Communist Party as well as 
Socialist regime (Nothing is meritorious in the Chinese 
Socialist regime), giving correlations of .25 between 
government officials and CCP and of .26 between government 
officials and Socialist regime. 
In response to the statement:"工 support the CCP", 
61.9 per cent of the subjects indicate their choice as 
"very disagree", 13.8 per cent say "quite disagree" and 8.4 
per cent pick "slightly disagree". The correlation between 
CCP and corruption is .31 and that between CCP and trust is 
•36. Such high correlations suggest that the students 
strongly associate the mischievous government officials and 
the problem of corruption with the CCP. This is further 
proved by the relatively lower correlation of .17 between 
CCP and the statement "Nothing is meritorious in Chinese 
Socialist regime". In other words, the culprit causing the 
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present situation in China is the government officials 
rather than the political system. 
This suggestion is further established by the 
respondents‘ much tolerated orientation toward the item: 
"Nothing is meritorious in the Chinese Socialist regime". 
Thirty-eight per cent of the students pick "slightly 
disagree" to this statement while 21.4 per cent take 
"slightly agree". 
Such observation should not be taken without 
reservation. The most possible explanation for the 
students' different attitudes toward the government 
officials and the political system is due to their lack of 
understanding on Chinese Socialist regime and its 
subsequent impact on the officials• This is shown by the 
fact that over 30 per cent of the students can answer those 
questions asking for the name of the officials but less 
than 15 per cent can the "four principles of PRC" and name 
the legislative body in China (Table 6.4). 
However, the close correlation of .26 between 
Socialist regime and the statement -- "If it had been the 
Taiwanese government ruling China, it would have done 
better than the coiimiimist Chinese government" implies that 
for those who do not favour Socialist regime may opt for 
the ruling under Kuomintang. Besides, this item also has 
a correlation of .21 with CCP and . 24 with trust. All have 
pointed to the postulation that the students are not 
entirely ignorant about the distinction between various 
political systems and can make their own preference. This 
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is further proved by the fact that the correlations between 
Beijing officials and Taiwan is just .12 which is smaller 
than that between Socialist regime and Taiwan. 
But many students find it difficult to assess the 
performance of the Taipei government. Twenty-five per cent 
of the subjects pick "no opinion" toward the statement: "If 
•it had been the Taiwanese government ruling China, it would 
have done better than the communist Chinese government". 
Meanwhile, 28.4 per cent choose "slightly agree" to the 
above assertion and 21.2 per cent say "slightly disagree". 
The relatively larger number of respondents have not given 
their opinion on the performance of the Taiwanese 
government is understandable due to the low coverage of 
Taiwan news in Hong Kong mass media. 
Despite the students‘ poor evaluation on the present 
Beijing officials, they do not take them as a collective 
after the communist takeover in 1949. In response to the 
assertion: "Merits outnumber demerits throughout Communist 
China regime in the past few decades", 27.9 per cent say 
they "slightly disagree", 19 per cent take "very disagree" 
and 16.5 per cent pick "quite disagree". Discarding their 
negative attitude toward this statement, their level of 
discontent is far below that on the incumbents. But the 
fact that 15.4 per cent of the students pick "no opinion" 
t〇 this declaration implies that the students find it hard 
to assess the performance of the Communist China in the 
past four decades. 
Looking ahead, the respondents are quite optimistic 
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with the future of China as 27.2 per cent choose "slightly 
aqroG'' to the item: "The communist Chinese government can 
govern better in the near future", and 22.5 per cent pick 
"slightly disagree", but 15.4 per cent say "quite agree" 
I 
and another 15.3 per cent take "very agree". And yet 16.5 
per cent of the subjects are more cautious by selecting "no 
opinion". 
On the other hand, the correlations between future 
projection and CCP is .28, between future projection and 
merits is .27, and between future projection and corruption 
is . 26. But for the correlation between future projection 
and Socialist regime is just .18. These findings suggest 
that the students have rested their hope of a better China 
in the :aiids of the government officials instead of the 
Socialist regime. This is consistent with their blame on 
the officials rather than the Socialist regime and implies 
that the concept of officials is more familial： than the 
notion of Socialist regime. Or, the act of the Beijing 
officials are so disappointing that they have caught most 
of the attention of the students in evaluating the Chinese 
government. 
On the students» evaluation of the performance of the 
Chinese officials with respect to Hong Kong, 30.2 per cent 
say they "slightly agree" with the statement: "The Chinese 
authorities have not taken Hong Kong people‘s interest into 
consideration in drafting the Basic Law", 2 0 per cent 
choose "very agree" and 19.3 per cent pick "quite agree". 
This reflects the respondents» general disapproving 
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attitudes toward the way the Beijing officials are dealing 
with the territory in drafting the Basic Law. 
Nevertheless, their criticism on this particular event is 
much more milder than their general impression of the 
Chinese officials. 
The extraordinarily high correlation of .41 between 
Basic Law and Socialist regime compared with . 27 between 
Basic Law and Chinese Communist Party and .15 between Basic 
Law and Beijing officials is interesting. This may reflect 
that the respondents have shared the territory‘s 
overwb ^ J uiing feeling that the Chinese government has tried 
to accomplish their task following the Socialist rule of 
game which is incompatible with Hong Kong society. 
Affective Orientations 
Forty per cent of the students take "slightly agree" 
to the assertion: "I love China", 14.5 per cent choose 
"slightly disagree" and 12.9 per cent pick "quite agree". 
The students hold even more reserved attitudes in 
their response to the declaration:"工 am willing to devote 
myself to China". Thirty-four per cent choose "slightly 
agree", 20 per cent take "quite agree" and 11.9 per cent 
pick "slightly disagree". But 17 per cent of the students 
only indicate "no opinion", showing their noncommittal 
stance. 
On top of their lukewarm love toward China, 60.7 per 
cent of the respondents say they are Hong Kong people while 
37.3 per cent admit they are Chinese, showing that the 
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students would rather identify with the colony than their 
mother country. 
This is further validated by the students‘ responses 
to the question asking for their preference on the outcome 
I 
of Hong Kong after 1997. Forty-six per cent of the 
students prefer "rule by the British government" and 36.6 
per cent choose "independent" with a meagre 7.6 per cent 
take "revert to China". 
Surprisingly, the students‘ reluctance to be ruled by 
the Chinese authorities is largely unrelated to their poor 
evaluation of these officials as is reflected by the 
relatively lower and even insignificant correlations 
between this item and those related to Beijing officials, 
but rather to their indifference toward China as is 
suggested by the . 19 correlation between this item and 
Chinese identity and the .14 correlation between this item 
and love for China. 
The students 丨 aversion to Chinese rule can also be 
traced back to their critical stance on the Beijing 
officia丄st performance in drafting the Basic Law as the 
correlation between these two items is .14• 
Stronger identification with China is related to a 
better evaluation of Socialist regime as is reflected in 
their .18 correlation. Meanwhile, the larger correlations 
between "工 love China" and merit of .18, between devote and 
merit of . 16, between "工 love China" and CCP of .12, and 
between devote and CCP of .12, all suggest that the 
students are aware that identification with China implies 
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association with a Socialist country. 
Cognitive Orientations 
On the students• performance on the test about 
political knowledge on China, they come up with very 
disappointing results (Table 6.3). Out of a full mark of 
14 scores, most students (18.3 per cent) have got zero 
score, while 11.7 per cent of the subjects have scored two 
marks. 
Table 6.3 
Cognitive level of students 
Correct ans No. of students Percentage 
0 88 18.3 
1 47 9.7 
2 56 11.7 
3 36 7.5 
4 40 8.3 
5 32 6.7 
6 37 7.7 
7 44 9.2 
8 31 6.4 
9 41 8.5 
10 10 2.2 
11 10 2.2 
12 3 .6 
13 5 1.0 
482 100.0 
With respect to the performance on individual question 
(Table 6.4), most students manage to answer correctly the 
question asking for the name of the Taiwan president (56.8 
per cent) and the National Day of Taiwan (53.3 per cent). 
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Table 6.4 
Answers to questions 
Questions Right Wrong 
m (%) 
Chairman of PRC 3 0.3 69.7 
Secretary of CCP 51.8 48.2 
Foundation year of PRC 43.9 56.1 
Director of Xinhua--Hongkong Branch 48.9 51.1 
President of Taiwan 56.8 43.2 
National Day of Taiwan 53.3 46.7 
Legislative body of PRC 11.1 88.9 
4 3 2 1 0 
Four Principles of PRC .4 2.5 5.2 5.3 86.5 
Three Principles of the Peoples 15. 0 25.9 9 .1 49 . 9 
The students‘ cognitive level is correlated more with 
their affection than evaluation. The correlation between 
"工 love China" and cognition whereas it is . 21 between 
Chinese identity and cognition. This implies that for 
subjects who have higher affection toward their mother 
country would tend to be more knowledgeable about China. 
In return, knowledge serves to be base upon which one can 
build one's affection which is not necessary to develop 
evaluation. 
Jkttitu-cJ.es and Characteristics of the Students 
In order to explore whether some basic characteristics 
of an individual would have affected one's orientation to 
China, the correlation between attitude items, cognition 
and seven control variables: sex, birth place, group of 
study, China-visited (for Hong Kong-born individual), 
length of residence in the territory (for China—born 
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subject), socio-economic status, and interest in China 
affairs, are computed (Table 6.5). 
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Table 6.5 
Correlations between attitudes and control variables 
Attitudes Sex Birth Group China- SES China- Length 
place interest visited of stay 
tau-c tau-c tau-c tau-b tau-c tau-c tau-c 
Govern -.11* -.02 -.01 -.00 .02 -.00 -.24* 
Corrupt .01 .04 .04 -.04 .02 .06 -.07 
Merit -.13* -.01 .03 .01 ,03 .08 -.23* 
Better .00 .02 .07* 一 . 1 4 * -.03 -.01 -.07 
Trust -.05 .01 -.01 -.06 .02 .02 -.23* 
Basic -.11* -.04 -.10* -.04 .03 -.04 -.31* 
Regime -.14* -.07* -.04 .03 .04 -.07 -.27* 
CCP -.06 -.02 .03 .00 .01 .06 -.11 
Love -.28* -.13* -.08* .27* .06 -.07 -.00 
Devote -.13* -.10* -.10* .19* .03 .01 .00 
Ident -.07 一 . 1 8 * -.11* .20* .10* -.02 -.06* 
Future -.08 -.01 -.03 -.02 -.03 .14* .00 
Taiwan .00 -.04 -.03 -.07 -.04 —.09 -.26* 
C o g n i t 一 . 2 6 * - . 1 0 * - . 4 3 * .20* .12* 一 . 3 8 * - . 1 9 * 
Note: Govern: The communist Chinese govt has governed 
China very well. 
Corrupt: Most communist Chinese govt officials are 
upright, only a few corrupt. 
Merit: Merits outnumber demerits throughout 
communist China regime in the past few 
decades. 
Better: The communist Chinese govt can govern better 
in the near future. 
Trust: trust toward China 
Basic: The Chinese authorities have not taken HK 
people‘s interest into consideration in 
drafting the Basic Law. 
Regime: Nothing is meritorious in Chinese Socialist 
regime. ‘ 
CCP: I support the CCP. 
Love: I love China. 
Devote: 工 am willing to devote myself to China. 
Ident: Chinese identity 
Future: Hong Kong future 
Taiwan: If it had been the Taiwanese govt ruling 
China, it would have done better than the 
communist Chinese govt. 
Cognit: level of cognition 
* p < .05 
Sex, birth place, group of study, length of residence, 
and China-interest are all quite fundamental features 
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affecting an individual丨s perception and feeling about 
China. On the other hand, the items on corruption in China 
and on CCP are both unrelated to any of these 
characteristics. For trust and Taiwan, they are only 
reversely correlated with the length of residence in the 
territory. This implies that the longer the Chinese 
immigrants‘ stay in Hong Kong, the lower their level of 
trust toward China becomes and the better they perceive 
Taiwan. 
Such non-correlation has suggested the existence of a 
common consensus on attitude toward Beijing authorities 
among adolescents despite their deep-rooted differences. 
On the contrary, affective orientations are 
consistently stronger within some types of people. They 
are: students born in China, arts students, the newer 
Chinese immigrants, and those who are interested in China 
affairs. However, the longer the China immigrated students 
stay in Hong Kong, the weaker is their affection to their 
native country. 
No matter how the Hong Kong culture has shaped the 
Chinese iirnnigrants» attitudes toward China, birth place is 
still an important indicator of greater affection to China. 
For the variable of birth place, the two components: China 
and Hong Kong are given scores of 1 and 2 respectively, has 
a correlation (tau-c) of -.13 with patriotism and a 
correlation of -.18 with Chinese identity. 
The negative correlations between length of residence 
and most evaluative items suggest that Hong Kong culture 
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has led them to put Chinese government in increasing bad 
light. 
Similar but weaker correlations are found for arts 
students. The variable of group, which refers to the 
students‘ subjects of study, includes:arts, science, 
technical and commercial. Its correlation with patriotism 
turns out to be 一 •08 while its correlation with Chinese 
identity is -.11, indicating that arts students are more 
patriotic and identified more with China as well. Since 
arts students normally take more subjects, for example: 
Chinese Literature and Chinese History, relating to Chinese 
culture, their profound understanding on China may breed 
stronger affection. 
Female students demonstrate higher level of patriotism 
of -.28 with the variable of sex in the increasing order of 
male to female, while male students are more critical of 
the Beijing officials and regime with a corirelatioii of -.11 
and 一。14 respectively. 
Regarding cognition, it has relatively high 
correlations with all the control variables, though the 
relations are not very strong for birth place and socio-
economic status. This means male students, arts students, 
the China-borns, the China—visitors, those from higher SES 
families and who are more interested in China affairs 
possess more knowledge about China. 
Parental Influence 
Judging from the percentage distribution of parental 
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attitudes, barring patriotism, it is obvious that the 
students have perceived their parents holding more 
favourable attitudes toward China (Table 6.6 and 6.7). 
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Table 6.6 
Perceived paternal political attitudes toward China: 
frequency distribution in percentage^ 
Attitudes 1 2 3 4 5 6 0^ 
The communist Chinese 27.9 29.2 19.0 7.0 3.4 1.6 11.9 
govt has governed 
China very well 
Most communist Chinese 40.8 23.2 13.1 5.8 3.9 2.4 11.0 
govt officials are upright, 
only a few corrupt 
Merits outnumber de- 16.5 17.0 20.4 12.4 5.8 2.5 25.4 
merits throughout 
Communist China regime 
in the past few decades 
The communist Chinese 2 . 6 3 . 9 16.5 18.3 16.2 13.7 28 . 8 
govt can govern better 
in the near future 
Trust 18.5 18.3 22.4 17.6 6.4 1.1 15.6 
The Chinese authorities 3.3 5.4 11.9 18.9 14.3 15.5 30.7 
have not taken HK people丨 s 
interest into consideration 
in drafting the Basic Law 
Nothing is meritorious 5.8 7.9 29.4 19. 4 13 .7 9.0 14 .8 
in Chinese Socialist -
regime 
I support the CCP 41.3 14.3 13.1 6.2 2.4 1.9 20.6 
I love China 7.3 6.6 17.6 26.8 15.8 8.2 17.7 
工 am willing to devote 8.6 7.4 11.0 24.8 7.1 6.3 34.8 
myself to China 
Chinese identity® 1.4 19.6 56.0 23.1 
Hong Kong future' 20.0 36.1 14.0 8.3 —— ——21.6 
If it had been the 8.0 10.1 20.8 22.1 3.2 3.4 32.5 
Taiwanese govt ruling 
China, it would have 
done better than the 
communist Chinese govt 
/ 
^The sura of the percentage in each item is 100. 
^The numbers 1 to 6 indicate increasing favourable toward 
the statement whereas 0 represents don*t know. 
others； 2: Hong Kong people; 3: Chinese 
9l: independent； 2: rule by the British govt； 3: revert to 
China; 4: no opinion 
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Table 6.7 
Perceived maternal political attitudes toward China: 
frequency distribution in percentage^^ 
Attitudes 1 2 3 4 5 6 0” 
The communist Chinese 33.9 30.4 14.6 3.8 1.1 .3 15.8 
govt has governed 
China very well 
Most communist Chinese 39.5 21.3 14.6 5.6 2.5 2.0 14.5 
govt officials are upright, 
only a few corrupt 
Merits outnumber de- 15.6 17.7 17.2 12.0 4.7 2.7 30.1 
merits throughout 
Communist China regime 
in the past few decades 
The communist Chinese 1.4 1.7 13.1 18.7 11.6 16.7 36.7 
govt can govern better 
in the near future 
Trust 21.4 20.7 24.8 13.8 1.8 .5 17.0 
The Chinese authorities 4.9 6.6 10.3 17.8 12.3 11.8 36.4 
have not taken HK people‘s 
interest into consideration 
in drafting the Basic Law 
Nothing is meritorious 4.2 7.8 24.7 17.1 10. 6 10.0 25.5 
in Chinese Socialist 
regime 
工 support the CCP 41.9 17.3 9.1 6.8 .8 1.5 22.6 
工 love China 10.8 9.0 15.7 22.4 10.5 6.0 25.5 
工 am willing to devote 11.8 8.8 10.7 19.4 5.5 3.6 40.2 
myself to China 
Chinese identity^^ 1.6 33.1 43.8 —— —— ——21.5 
Hong Kong future^^ 17.6 41.1 6.5 11.1 —— ——23.6 
If it had been the 6.2 7.0 15.5 17.1 6.7 4.9 42.6 
Taiwanese govt ruling China, 
it would have done better than the 
communist Chinese govt 
Generally speaking, the students perceive their 
parents as holding similar attitudes as themselves. This 
is shown by the same modes and similar percentage 
'^The sum of the percentage in each item is 100. 
iiThe numbers 1 to 6 indicate increasing favourable toward 
the statement whereas 0 represents don't know. 
others； 2: Hong Kong people; 3: Chinese 
independent； 2: rule by the British govt； 3: revert to 
China; 4: no opinion 
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distribution in 11 items as chosen by the students as their 
own orientations as well as their perceived parental 
attitudes. The very striking exception is larger number of 
fathers (72.8 per cent) and mothers (55.8 per cent) 
recognize themselves as Chinese whereas only 37.3 per cent 
of the students think they are Chinese. 
Besides, the students perceive their fathers as having 
better evaluation of Beijing officials as the majority of 
the respondents (29.2 per cent) have picked "quite 
disagree" in response to the statement "The cominunist 
Chinese government has governed China very well". But the 
students• and their* perceived maternal attitudes on this 
item are "very disagree" instead. 
The students and their perceived maternal attitudes 
also have one variation which is on their response toward 
the assertion "Merits outnumber demerits throughout 
Communist China regime in the past few decades". Most 
students (17.7 per cent) have picked "quite disagree" to 
this declaration for their mothers while they themselves 
have taken "slightly disagree". 
Another difference is found on the trust toward 
Chinese government. The students have concentrated their 
choices on the extreme "very distrust" whereas they 
perceived their parental attitudes as "slightly distrust". 
It does appear on the surface as a great divergence between 
the subjects and their perceived parental attitudes. But 
their trust level before June 4 event shares remarkably 
similarity with their perceived parental attitudes on 
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trust. This leads to the suspicion that the students have 
mistaken the question asking for their perceived parental 
trust level as having made particular reference before the 
crackdown. And the wordings of the question which states 
"in general, your father * s/mother‘s trust toward Communist 
Chinese government" have spawned such result. 
The inclusion of "no opinion" on the part of the 
students and "don't know" on the part of the perceived 
parental attitudes have made it difficult to compare the 
distribution between subjects and perceived parental 
attitudes. 
By deleting the "no opinion" and "don‘t know" 
responses in these attitude items, it turns out that the 
students have in general perceived more favourable parental 
attitudes in comparison with themselves. 
It is interesting to note that larger number of 
students see themselves having higher level of patriotism 
and better evaluation of Socialist regime. 
It is natural to think that people who see themselves 
as patriotic toward their native country should strongly 
identify with that nation. Therefore, the interesting 
observation that students who identify themselves as Hong 
Kong people see themselves as more patriotic than their 
parents who think they are Chinese reveals that the 
students and their parents have dissimilar interpretations 
of patriotisiiu It is likely that the students see 
themselves as overseas Chinese who normally demonstrate a 
sense of patriotism without having a Chinese nationality. 
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Among the inter-item correlations for both fathers and 
mothers, they show stronger correlations than found between 
students丨 attitudes (see Appendix 3 and 4). 
Before proceeding onwards, it is necessary to point 
out that the statistical analyses in this research is done 
tliroug；! '^PSS-X. Its design automatically deletes all the 
cases with missing values as invalid cases in conducting 
any statistical calculations. Since the options "no 
opinion" and "don't know" are considered as missing values 
in this research, the items which are found to have too 
many missing cases are deleted by the researcher before 
x'/orking out the correlations so as to avoid a great 
reduction in the number of valid cases. 
Apart from this, the coverage of the concept of China 
is another consideration in picking up the items for 
further analyses. Therefore, the statements are chosen 
with regard to both the number of valid cases and their 
ability to probe into the students丨 attitudes toward China 
with respect to their affective and evaluative 
orientations. 
I 
Basing on these criteirioii, five items are chosen. The 
assertion that "The communist Chinese government has 
governed China very well" is seen to represent the 
respondents ® evaluation on the performance of Beijing 
officials. The statement "Nothing is meritorious in 
Chinese Socialist regime" is regarded as an assessment of 
the students‘ evaluative orientation toward the Socialist 
regime. The trust level after the June 4 event is another 
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similar attempt to gauge the students‘ evaluative attitude 
toward the Beijing officials. "I love China" is the 
declaration which is expected to value the subjects‘ level 
of patriotism. Lastly, the question asking for the 
I 
students• national identity surveys their degree of 
identification with their mother country. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Findings III: Hypotheses Testing 
Mass Media 
In dealing with the effect of mass media, the 
representative sample is used to explore the impact of 
general exposure while the special sample is employed to 
reveal the influence of partisan press. 
Hypothesis 1 
It states that "higher news exposure correlates with 
liigher political .knowledge, higher interest in China 
affairs, and more frequent discussion v/ith parents, 
teachers and peers on China affairs.“ 
By correlating news exposure and cognition (Table 
7.1), the product moment correlation (r) gives a value of 
一 . 0 1 and is not significant which seems to be in complete 
contrast with most findings saying that cognition directly 
correlates with news exposure in past literature. 
Table 7.1 
Correlations between news exposure & China 
news exposure with other variables 
Discussion News exposure China news 
r r 
Cognition -.01 .22* 
Interest in China affairs .15* .38* 
Discussion with parents .12* .21* 
Discussion with teachers .15* .15* 
Discussion with peers . 14* .27* 
* p < .05 
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Nevertheless, a deeper thought would reveal that the 
low correlation between news exposure and cognition and 
attitudes may simply imply that news exposure in general 
which includes non-China news is not a good measurement. 
To narrow down the exposure focus, China news exposure is 
taken. The correlation (tau-c) between China news exposure 
and cognition turns out to be .17 and is significant (p < 
.05). This findings further establish the idea that China 
news exposure is the more appropriate predictor on 
cognition. 
In computing the relationships between news exposure 
and interest in China affairs and discussion, both news 
exposure and China news exposure are used as independent 
variables. In an attempt to arrive at a fair comparison 
between the figures arising from these two independent 
variables which are at different levels, product moment 
correlations are computed even for China news exposure 
which is in fact an ordinal variable. 
Results show that news exposure is positively and 
significantly correlated to interest in China politics and 
discussion. 
Parallel comparisons on the correlations between news 
exposure and the dependent variables with those between 
China news exposure and the corresponding dependent 
variables show that China news exposure gives larger 
figures. This implies that it has greater explanatory 
power than news exposure on interest in China affairs and 
discussion. 
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Therefore, hypothesis (1) is supported with the 
exception of cognition which is only found to be positively 
and significantly correlated with China news exposure. 
Such deviation seems to suggest that cognition demands 
a higher level of exposure to the relevant media than 
discussion. 
Apart from the above findings, it is also interesting 
to investigate the effect of news exposure, media exposure 
and China news exposure on the formation of attitudes 
toward China. 
results (Table 7.2) show that both news and media 
exposure do not have significant impact upon the students. 
The exceptions are two. Firstly, news exposure correlates 
directly with patriotism. Secondly, high media exposure 
leads to greater ignorance toward China. For China news, 
longer exposure would result in better evaluation of 
Socialist regime, stronger patriotism and Chinese identity 
and higher knowledgeability about China. 
Table 7.2 
Correlations among attitudes & media variables (r) 
Attitudes News Media China news 
exposure exposure exposure 
Evaluation of officials 03 一 . 0 3 .07 
Evaluation of regime .02 .02 .17* 
Trust .08 .08 -.03 
Patriotism .11* 一 . 0 6 .26* 
Chinese identity .01 -.07 .20* 
Cognition -.01 一 . 2 4 * .22* 
* p < .05 
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Hypothesis 2 
It states that "higher television entertainment 
exposure correlates with lower cognition, and less 
favourable attitudes toward China.“ 
The strong negative correlation of -.24 between 
cognition and television entertainment exposure suggests 
that ignorance increases with one's exposure to television 
entertaj..:iT\ient (Table 7.3). 
Table 7.3 
Correlations between attitudes & 
TV entertainment exposure 
Attitudes TV 
r 
Evaluation of officials -.01 
Evaluation of regime 一 . 0 5 
Trust .07 
Patriotism -.12* 
Chinese identity -.12* 
Cognition -.24* 
* p < .05 
Looking at the correlations (r) between attitudes and 
television entertainment exposure, it is found that 
exposure is reversely related to patriotism and Chinese 
identity- This implies that television entertainment 
program has made the audience not identify with China but 
with Hong Kong instead. However, no significant 
correlation is obtained between TV entertainment exposure 
and evaluative orientation. Hence, hypothesis (2) is 
supported for cognition and affective orientation. 
Comparing the correlations between China news exposure 
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and affective orientations and cognition with those between 
TV entertainment exposure and the same attitude items, it 
is found that these two different types of exposure produce 
conflicting effect on the youngsters. While China news 
exposure leads to greater affection, TV entertainment 
exposure just imbues alienation toward China. To further 
explore the counteracting effect of these two types of 
exposure on the students, the correlations between China 
news exposure and patriotism, Chinese identity and 
cognition are broken down to high, medium and low TV 
entertainment exposure. 
Th「i findings (Table 7.4) show that the correlations 
between China news exposure and attitudes decrease with 
increasing level of TV entertainment exposure, implying 
that TV entertainment can dilute one's affection toward 
China and the impact from China news. And the 
counteracting effect is the largest in the case of 
cognition where its correlation with China news exposure 
drops to .03 at high TV entertainment exposure. 
Table 7.4 
China news exposure & attitudes correlations 
controlled by TV entertainment exposure (tau-c) 
^.ttitudes Low Medium High 
Patriotism .30* .15* .17* 
Chinese identity .23* . 1 5 * . 1 1 
Cognition .21* . 14* .'o3 
N=158 N=149 N=148 
* p < .05 
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Hypothesis 3 
It states that "readers of partisan newspapers are 
more knowledgeable in China, demonstrate stronger 
patriotism and Chinese identity than readers of centrist 
papers ^  wiiile readers of rightist press have the worst 
evaluation of Beijing officials and Socialist regime.“ 
Since it is an interesting subject to investigate the 
effect of partisan press on the readers, the readership of 
partisan press in the representative sample is extremely 
low, rendering it impossible to discover any effect. To 
remedy this situation, the special sample in this research 
which includes quite a number of partisan school students 
whom are expected to be readers of partisan press is taken 
for analysis. The following findings serve to reveal 
special features. 
In conducting the investigation, two statistical 
analyses are done. In the first analysis, the media 
partisanship is arranged in the ascending order of 
rightist, centrist, and leftist, whereas in the second 
analysis, the media partisanship is arranged in the order 
of centrist, rightist and leftist. These rearrangements 
are done as some features are expected to change along the 
degiree of leftist inclination, while some other 
characteristics are expected to be different between 
partisan and non-partisan newspapers * readers. These 
differences are to be discovered by calculating Kendall‘s 
tau-c which would show the direction of correlation. 
On cognition (Table 7.5), the correlation is much 
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higher in the second analysis which shows that centrist 
press readers are most ignorant about China. This is 
probably due to the relatively low emphasis on China news 
among centrist press which are widely read among the 
centrist press readers under study. 
Table 7.5 
Comparison among readers‘ attitudes 
with respect to media partisanship 
2Vttitiides Sample one^ Sample two^ 
tau-c tau-c 
Evaluation of officials .13* .09* 
Evaluation of regime .11* .10* 
Trust .08* .06* 
Patriotism .09* .14* 
Chinese identity (tau-b) .10* .18* 
Cognition • 03 .21* 
* p < .05 
In general, the correlations are quite strong between 
attitudes and media partisanship for both analyses. 
Comparing the correlations between these two analyses, 
the evaluative orientations: evaluation of Beijing 
officials, evaluation of regime and trust, all have higher* 
correlations with media partisanship in the analysis which 
arranges the press in the order of leftist inclination. 
Such findings suggest that the rightist readers have the 
worst evaluation on Beijing government. 
Meanwhile, on the affective orientations: patriotism 
^Both school and media partisanship are arranged in the 
increasing order of rightist, centrist, and leftist. 
Both school and media partisanship are arranged in the 
increasing order of centrist, rightist and leftist. 
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and Chinese identity, the correlations are higher in the 
case which arranges the press in the order of centrist, 
rightist, and leftist. This shows that readers of centrist 
press have the least affection for China. 
Therefore, hypothesis (3) is supported. 
Family 
Since it is expected that the political attitudes held 
by the parents are largely unrelated with the parental 
style and student-parents relationship, only the 
representative sample whose findings can be projected onto 
the population are taken for analysis. 
Hypothesis 4 
It states that "the possibility that the students 
share similar attitudes with their parents is greater than 
chance, with greater student-mother congruence, and larger 
student-parents correlations for homogeneous parents.“ 
The correlations (tau-c) on attitude items between 
child and parents (Table 7.6) are quite high, ranging from 
»20 to .52. 
Table 7.6 
Comparison among student-parents, student-father, 
student-mother attitudes‘ correlations 
Attitudes Parents Father Mother 
tau-c tau-b tau-b 
Evaluation of officials .22* .22* . 30* 
Evaluation of regime .30* .28* .28* 
Trust .20* .21* .28* 
Patriotism .52* .49* . 52* 
Chinese identity .43* .42* .51^ 
* P < .001 
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The correlations are especially strong on patriotism 
(•52) and Chinese identity (.43), whereas they are lower 
for evaluation of government officials (.22) and trust 
(.20). The especially strong correlations on patriotism 
and Chinese identity show that the parents can transmit 
their affective orientations to their offsprings more 
effectively. 
A breakdown on student-father and student-mother 
correlations reveals that student-mother congruence is 
greater than that of student-father, with the exception of 
evaluation of regime with which both correlations record 
the same value of . 28. Likewise, the difference on 
patriotism is barely . 03 whereas the differences are in 
average .08 for Chinese identity, evaluation of officials, 
and trust. Yet, this implies that student-mother 
congruence is larger than that of student-father especially 
in the case of Chinese identity, evaluation of Beijing 
officials, and trust. 
To investigate the effect of homogeneity of parental 
attitudes on the inculcation of orientations on their 
offsprings, the variable of the homogeneity of parental 
attitudes are divided into three categories: homogeneous 
(high), heterogeneity with difference in one scale point 
(medium), heterogeneity with more than one scale point 
(low)• Since there are only three choices for Chinese 
identity: Chinese, Hong Kong people, and others, it is 
divided into homogeneous (high) and heterogeneous (mediim). 
Results on student-parents correlation (tau-c) under 
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different homogeneities show that the correlation increases 
with increasing homogeneity in all five attitudes (Table 
7.7). 
Table 7.7 
Student-parents correlations under 
different homogeneity (tau-c) 
Attitudes Low Medium High 
Evaluation of officials 04 . 1 5 * .34* 
N=51 N=127 N=174 
Evaluation of regime .15* .30* . 4 0 * 
N=83 N=9 0 N=133 
Trust .08 .19* ,22* 
N=44 N=132 N二172 
Patriotism .35* .51* .58* 
N=49 N=lll N=129 
Chinese identity .07 .39* 
N=55 .N=2 75 
* p < .05 
The patterns are so obvious that it is almost 
doubtless to say alike parents can duplicate their 
attitudes onto their offsprings. Moreover, the more 
homogeneous the parents are, the more likely they can 
foster a child sharing similar attitudes with them. This 
is understandable as children who are bred with parents 
holding the same attitude may mean that they are subject to 
the impact of one-sided opinion while for those children 
who have parents holding diverse attitudes are exposed to 
competing views. 
It then follows that hypothesis (4) is supported. 
Following the findings on greater student-mother 
congruence, it is interesting to further investigate 
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whether the student would identify more with parent of the 
same sex or the opposite sex, therefore the subject ‘ s 
correlations with either parent is estimated. 
In the case of father (Table 7.8), his correlations 
with son are higher than those with daughter on evaluation 
of Beijing officials, evaluation of regime and trust. But 
for patriotism, father—daughter correlation (.51) is higher 
than father-son (.44) . Both father-son and father-daughter 
correlations are the same (.42) on Chinese identity. This 
shows that the daughter tends to identify with the father 
on affective orientation, especially patriotism, while 
father-son correlation is greater for evaluative 
orientation. 
Table 7.8 
Student-parents correlations with respect 
to son & daughter (tau-b� 
Attitudes Father Mother 
Son Daughter Son Daughter 
Evaluation of officials .44* .51* .48* .51* 
Evaluation of regime .42* .42* .56* .49* 
Trust .30* .17* .41* .22* 
Patriotism ‘ .25* .18* .26* .29* 
Chinese identity .38* .20* .27* .29* 
p < . 01 
In the case of mother, mother-son correlation for 
Chinese identity is larger than mother-daughter whereas the 
reverse holds true for patriotism. On the evaluative 
orientation, it is apparent that mother-son correlation of 
.41 on evaluation of officials is much higher than that of 
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mother-daughter correlation of .22. But for trust and 
evaluation of regime, mother-daughter correlations are 
slightly higher than that of mother-son. Since the 
differences are merely .02 for evaluation of regime and . 03 
for trust, it is not in any sense significant. 
Comparing the students‘ correlations with either 
parent, it is found that they tend to identify more closely 
with the parent of the opposite sex on affective 
orientation with father-daughter on patriotism and mother-
son on Chinese identity. On evaluation of Socialist regime 
and trust, both son and daughter sit with parent of the 
same sex. And for evaluation of Beijing officials, both 
son and daughter incline to associate themselves with the 
father. 
Hypothesis 5 
It touches upon the characteristics of family 
structure which states that "the closer student-parents 
relationship, the more democratic the parents, and the 
higher the level of family politicization are, the more 
likely is the student to adopt his parental attitudes•” 
Closeness is defined as the degree of intimacy between 
the students with parents. Democratic environment refers 
to the student 丨 s degree of freedom of expression on his own 
personal matters at home. And family politicization 
measures for the parental interest in China affairs and 
awareness of China news. These three variables are 
computed and divided into low and high with approximately 
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equal distribution in each category. The student-parents 
correlations are broken down in accordance with the two 
categories in all three cases. 
The breakdown on the student-parents correlations in 
I 
accordance with closeness are higher across the board in 
the case of high closeness though the disparity between 
high and low in evaluation of Socialist regime is just .02 
(Table 7.9). This supports the postulation that the closer 
student-parents relationship may, on the one hand, allow 
the student to learn more about the opinion of the parents, 
while on the other hand, enhance the child is identification 
and imitation with his parents. 
Table 7.9 
Student-parents correlations 
under different closeness (tau-c) 
Attitudes Low High 
Evaluation of officials .14* .26* 
Evaluation of regime .28* .30* 
Trust .16* .21* 
Patriotism .45* .54* 
Chinese identity .38* .45* 
N=209 N=257 
I 
* p < .05 
The second characteristics under study is the family 
democratic environment. In the breakdown analysis with 
respect to family democratic environment (Table 7.10), it 
is found that the student-parents correlations are higher 
in patriotism, Chinese identity and trust for high 
democratic family. However, the difference between high 
and low democratic home on patriotism and trust are just 
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•03 which is almost negligible. Hence, greater correlation 
in high democratic home is only observed in Chinese 
identity. While for evaluation of officials, and 
evaluation of regime, the reverse holds true. This seems 
to suggest that students who enjoy a greater say at home 
tend to develop their own orientations different from their 
parents. But it is still interesting to note that more 
democratic parents can transmit their Chinese identity —一 
an af vr^rition 一 一 which is unlikely to be built up by 
reasoning onto their offsprings• 
Table 7.10 
Student-parents correlations under different 
democratic environment (tau-c) 
Attitudes . High 
Evaluation of officials .27* ,18* 
Evaluation of regime .32* .26* 
Trust .18* .'21* 
Patriotism .50* .53* 
Chinese identity .39* ,45* 
N=190 N=276 
* p < .01 
By breaking down student-parents correlations 
according to family politicization (Table 7.11), among the 
five attitudes, more significant differences are found for 
evaluation of officials and patriotism, with higher 
correlations in more politicized families. But no 
differences are found for Chinese identity and trust. Out 
of these five items, the correlation on evaluation of 
Socialist regime gives the reverse trend. But since the 
difference is just .03, this does not imply significant 
variation. Therefore, the postulation that students in 
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more politicized families exhibit greater congruence with 
parents holds certain truth in itself. 
Table 7.11 
Student-parents correlations under different 
family politicization (tau-c》 
Attitudes Higli 
Evaluation of officials .14* .26* 
Evaluation of regime .31* .28* 
Trust .20* .20* 
Patriotism .40* .55* 
Chinese identity .41* .41* 
N=190 N=276 
^ p < .05 
To sum up, among the three family characteristics 
being examined, closeness is the most effective tool in 
transmitting parental orientation onto the child in all 
respects. For democratic environment, it is instrumental 
in transmitting Chinese identity whereas for family 
politicization, it is valuable in the case of patriotism 
and evaluation of Beijing officials. 
Hypothesis (5) is supported to a certain extent. 
The above findings on closer student-mother 
I 
relationship, together with the results that student-mother 
congruence is larger than student-father congruence seem to 
suggest that the closer student-mother relationship is one 
possible explanation. 
Prompted by this suggestion, student-father and 
student-mother correlations are broken down in accordance 
with the closeness with the respective parent. 
The breakdown analyses on both parents give results 
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which fall well within expectation, with larger 
correlations found for high closeness and greater student-
mother congruence in most cases (Table 7.12). 
Table 7.12 
Student-parents correlations controlled by 
closeness with either parent (tau-b) 
Attitudes Father Mother 
Low High Low High 
Evaluation of officials •10 .26* .06 .33* 
Evaluation of regime .22* .31* . 49* . 52* 
Trust .12 .23* .23* .29* 
Patriotism .32* .54* .24* . 28* 
Chinese identity . 35* .44* .38* .53'^ 
N=148 N=320 N 二 63 N=410 
p < .001 
However, a closer look would find that the differences 
between high and low closeness on student-mother 
correlations are not very significant among the attitudes 
items of: patriotism, evaluation of regime and trust (from 
•03 to .06), whereas the same differences are found to be 
consistently larger among all items for the case of father. 
This may suggest that student-mother correlations are 
in general high regardless of the extent of student-mother 
closeness. In the contrary, student-father closeness is 
quite predictive on student-father correlations, showing 
that student-father closeness is important in the 
transmission of attitudes from father to child. But for 
mothers, some other significant factors are at work in 
determining the greater student-mother congruence. 
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Hypothesis 6 
It states "students from higher status home tend to 
have greater correlations with their parents, perceived 
greater parental influence, see their parents as more 
interested in China affairs and have a stronger personal 
interest in China affairs than students from lower status 
home.“ 
On the effect of socio-economic status, the student-
parents correlations are broken down in relation to high, 
medium and low socio-economic status. 
The breakdown on student-parents correlations show 
that student-parents congruence does not increase with 
increasing socio-economic status (Table 7.13). Comparing 
the students from high social class with low social class, 
barring patriotism, the correlations are higher for high 
social class, but the differences are not very large with 
the exception of trust. And yet, the student-parents 
correlations are higher in high socio—economic status than 




Student-parents correlations at different 
socio-economic status (tau-c� 
Attitudes Low Medium High 
Evaluation of officials .23* .21* .27* 
Evaluation of regime .26* .29* . 29* 
Trust .13* .16女 .29* 
Patriotism .53* .45* .51* 
Chinese identity .40* .61* .45* 
N=152 N=98 N=152 
* p < .01 
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In contrasting the correlations between high and the 
other two social classes shows that students in low and 
medium socio-economic status exhibit larger congruence with 
their parents on affective orientations, while the reverse 
is observed on evaluative orientations. 
This seems to suggest that students in the higher 
social class tend to sit with their financially better—off 
parents on their judgement of the Beijing authorities but 
they hold reservations on their parents» affective 
orientations. With respect to the students from lower 
social class, they would rather accept their parents‘ 
affective orientations and retain their own value 
judgement. 
On the correlation (tau-c) between perceived parental 
influence and socio-economic status, tau-c gives a value of 
•15 showing that the better-off students see their parents 
as more influential figures (Table 7.14). 
Table 7.14 
Items by socio-economic status 
Items Tau-c Significance level 
Perceived parental influence .15 p < .001 
Family politicization .16 p < .ool 
Interest in China politics .08 not significant 
Aside from perceived parental influence, the 
correlation between family politicization or parental 
interest in China and socio-economic status is .16. This 
shows that students in higher SES see their parents as more 
interested in China affairs. 
However, it is surprising to note that the student‘s 
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interest in China affairs does not increase with socio-
economic status. The correlation (tau-c) is as low as .08 
and is not significant, showing that family status is a not 
a good predictor of student‘s interest toward China 
I 
politics. 
Hence, hypothesis (6) is supported with the exception 
of higher SES students do not have greater interest in 
China affairs. 
School 
In exploring the effect of school on the students, the 
representative sample is used to examine the influence of 
school type on the subjects, while the special sample is 
used to investigate the impact of medium of instruction and 
the effect of partisan school on the adolescents. 
To start with, the effect of school type is examined 
first. Though school type is defined as government, 
subsidized and private schools in this research, the 
following analysis groups government and famous schools 
together as they both tend to dilute the student's sense of 
Chinese identity. In fact, the major change in the sample 
only involves changing the school type of Diocesan Boys ‘ 
School from subsidized to famous school. 
Hypothesis 7 
It states that "students from government and famous 
schools possess less favourable attitudes, are less 
knowledgeable toward China, have fewer discussion and 
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smaller interest on China affairs than students from 
subsidized and private schools.“ 
In the analysis, the three components: private school, 
subsidized school, and famous and government schools of the 
( 
V 
-variable school type are assigned the scores of 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. 
By correlating students» attitudes with school type, 
only cognition and Chinese identity show significant 
results. The correlation (tau-c) is high for cognition 
which gives a value of .46 whereas it (tau-b) is .13 for 
Chinese identity (Table 7.15). 
Table 7.15 
Attitudes by school type^ 
Items Tau-c Significance level 
Evaluation of officials -.01 not significant 
Evaluation of regime .02 not significant 
Trust -.06 not significant 
Patriotism .06 not significant 
Chinese identity (tau-b) .13 p < .01 
Cognition .46 p < .001 
School atmosphere .15 p < .001 
Interest in China politics .06 not significant 
The finding showing that students from government and 
famous schools are more knowledgeable in China is not 
entirely unexpected though it is contrary to what has been 
perceived since the students from the two government 
schools and the famous school in the sample score better 
academic results than the others. And cognition is in fact 
largely related to one's general knowledge. It then 
^School type is arranged in the increasing order of private 
school, subsidized school, and famous and government school• 
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follows that better academic result goes hand in hand with 
higher cognition. 
Meanwhile, the fact that students from government and 
famous schools exhibit greater Chinese identity somehow 
goes arraj.nst previous discussion that they are taught not 
to identify with China. But a closer look at the inter— 
attitudes correlations for all students reveals that 
cognition correlates similarly with both Chinese identity 
and patriotism, and are greater than the other items. 
Therefore, the observed stronger Chinese identity found 
among government and famous schools students are in 
relation with their high cognition• But for another 
attitude item 一 一 patriotism 一 一 which is also a measure of 
affective orientation, students from government and famous 
schools do not have stronger patriotism compared with other 
students. This shows that love for one's mother country 
goes beyond a mere national identification in the eyes of 
these students. 
Regarding the correlation (tau-c) between school 
atmosphere and school type, it is .15 which means more 
1 
discussion is found in government and famous schools. This 
finding is contrary to previous assumption that students in 
government schools are highly discouraged to discuss China 
politics in school. Such result can be explained by the 
fact that these academically sound students in government 
and famous schools are more eager to participate in 
discussion than their counterpart in subsidized and private 
schools who may have to spare more time on school work. 
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The correlation (tau-c) between interest in China 
affairs and school type is just . 06 (not significant) which 
is smaller than the .15 correlation between school 
atmosphere and school type. This implies the differences 
( 
in self-perceived interest are smaller than that of actual 
discussion. In other words, students in subsidized and 
private schools say they are interested in China politics 
but seldom actually discuss them. 
In spite of this discrepancy found on the 
relationships between school type and interest in China 
politics, and that between school type and discussion 
atmosphere, interest in China politics has a correlation 
(tau-c) of .29 (p < .001) with school atmosphere, showing 
that more discussion in school helps in nourishing interest 
in China affairs. From these seemingly conflicting 
results, what can be concluded is students who are both 
interested in China affairs and always discuss it are not 
divided according to school type, and may be found in 
indivici叩 1 school. 
Nonetheless, the above findings refute the underlying 
thought that students in government and famous schools 
would be most distant from and most ignorant about China, 
and have the least discussion and interest. It rather 
turns out that students‘ academic performance seem to be an 
important variable in determining cognition, discussion and 
even interest. 
Hence, hypothesis (7) is rejected. 
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Hypothesis 8 
Before proceeding onto the following statistical 
analyx -：：：;, it has to be clarified that the purpose of the 
coining analyses serve to reveal the features in special 
cases which is not an attempt to generalize to the 
population. 
Hypothesis (8) states that "students from English 
secondary school show less favourable attitudes, are less 
knowledgeable toward China and have smaller interest on 
China affairs than Chinese school.“ 
In testing this hypothesis, all the schools in the 
sample are classified into two categories: Chinese school 
and English schools. The former is assigned a score of 1 
while the latter is given a score of 2 in the analysis• 
Results show that the correlations (tau-c) between 
attitudes and school categories are all negative which 
indicate that students show increasingly negative attitudes 
from Chinese to English schools (Table 7.16). 
Table 7.16 
Attitudes by schools' medium of instruction^ 
Items Tau-c Significance level 
Evaluation of officials -.08 p < .05 
Evaluation of regime 13 p < .001 
Trust 一 . 0 5 not significant 
Patriotism -.21 p < .001 
Chinese identity (tau-b) -.22 p < .001 
Cognition -.00 not significant 
School atmosphere 一 . 1 4 p < .001 
Interest in China politics -.11 p < .01 
^School is arranged in the ascending order of Chinese and 
English schools. 
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The strongest correlation found among five attitude 
items is Chinese identity with a value of 一 . 2 2 , and the 
second strong correlation is found with patriotism with a 
value of -.21. 
The sole exception is the correlation on trust with 
tau-c of 一 . 0 5 and is not significant. Another similar item 
measures for the same dimension of trust which is the 
evaluation of Beijing officials also gives a relatively low 
correlation of 一 . 0 8 . Such consensus on the views toward 
the Beijing authorities may be an aftermath of June 4 
event. 
But it is surprising to note that there is no 
significant difference in cognition and tau-c indeed gives 
-.00, showing that the students from both Chinese and 
English schools have similar performance on the test on 
knowledge about China. 
Contrary to their ordinary level of cognition, the 
reported interest in China politics and school climate on 
discussion are both higher in Chinese schools with the 
correlation of -.11 and -.14 respectively, showing that 
students in Chinese school do pay more attention on China 
affairs but without acquiring more knowledge about China 
accordingly. 
One possible explanation for the discrepancy found 
between knowledge level and favourable attitudes is that 
the building up of national identification does not 
necessarily have to be grounded on extensive knowledge. 
Moreover, knowledge about China is just assessed by a short 
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test on facts in China which may not be intensive enough to 
grasp the situation, other factors such as students' 
intelligence may also have affected the respondents' 
performance. Of course, the possibility that the design of 
( 
the test is not a good measurement of cognition cannot be 
ruled out. 
Therefore, hypothesis (8) is supported apart from 
insignificant difference found on cognition. 
But it must be mentioned that, in the above analysis, 
aside from Homantin government school which is also a 
Chinese school is classified in the category of Chinese 
school ；, the remaining two government and famous schools 
which are Queen Elizabeth School and Diocesan Boys‘ School 
are taken as English school. While the students in these 
two schools demonstrate greater Chinese identity than 
subjects in subsidized and private schools in the 
representative sample, they exhibit weaker Chinese identity 
compared with students in Chinese school. Thus, students 
from government and famous schools display relatively 
stronger Chinese identity than respondents in subsidized 
( 
and private schools but show relatively weaker Chinese 
identity than subjects in Chinese school. 
Indeed, with the exception of Homantin government 
school, the other Chinese schools are all partisan schools. 
Hence, it is not surprising that these students show more 
favourable attitudes toward China. Of course, a school's 
partisanship overrides their teaching medium in shading 
their Chinese colour. It is better to compare a group of 
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Chinese and non-partisan school students with that of 
English schools in order to test the importance of teaching 
medium in the acculturation process. However, the fact 
that these partisan schools adopt Chinese as their teaching 
( 
medium proves that mother tongue is instrumental in the 
transmission of cultural traits. 
Hypotheses 9 and 10 
Hypothesis (9) states that "students from partisan 
school display stronger patriotism and Chinese identity 
than non-partisan school, while students from rightist 
school have the poorest evaluation of Beijing officials and 
Chinese Socialist regime.“ 
Hypothesis (10) states that "students from partisan 
school are more knowledgeable, more interested in China 
politics, and have more discussion on China affairs than 
non-partisan school.“ 
::ri order to reveal this peculiar feature among the 
rightists, two statistical analyses are done in comparing 
the students in partisan and non-partisan schools on their 
attitudes toward China by using the special sample which 
includes all schools. 
In the first test, the three components: rightist, 
centrist and leftist of the variable of partisan school are 
assigned the scores of 1, 2, and 3 respectively. In the 
second analysis, the original scores for rightist and 
centrist schools are reversed. Together with the 
statistical correlation of tau-c which correlates items in 
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a cortain direction, a comparison on the results of the 
above two different analyses may reveal the interesting 
features of the rightists that they may sometimes hold more 
favourable but sometimes less favourable attitudes than the 
I 
centrists. 
The results (Table 7.17) correspond to the above 
prediction. 
Table 7.17 
Comparison among students ® attitudes 
with respect to school partisanship 
Items Sample one^ Sample two^ 
tau-c tau-c 
Evaluation of officials .16* .12* 
Evaluation of regime .13* .17-
Trust •11* •07* 
Patriotism .09* .21* 
Chinese identity .10* .21* 
Cognition .17* 01 
Interest in China politics 03 .08* 
School atmosphere .06* .15* 
* p < .05 
By comparing the correlations (tau-c) between these 
two analyses, greater correlations between patriotism and 
Chinese identity are found in the second test which 
arranges the students in the order of centrist, rightist, 
and leftist. This suggests that students from partisan 
schools 一- rightist and leftist -一 generally share a 
stronger sense of nationality than the centrists. 
^School is arranged in the increasing order of rightist, 
centrist and leftist. 
^School is arranged in the ascending order of centrist, 
rightist and leftist. 
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On the evaluation of Beijing officials and trust, the 
correlations are higher in the first test which arranges 
the students in the order of rightist, centrist and 
leftist. This reflects that students from rightist schools 
( 
have the worst evaluation of Beijing officials while their 
leftist counterparts have the best evaluations. 
On the evaluation of Socialist regime, it is 
interesting to note that correlation in the second test is 
higher than in the first test. This means rightist 
students favour socialism more than centrist students. 
Viewing from another perspective, students in Hong 
Kong are raised in a capitalist society. Students in 
centrist schools, without being taught to identify with 
either party, are most vulnerable to the impact of 
capitalist values. Therefore, they are most hostile to 
socialism which is considered to be inferior to capitalism. 
But for rightist students, their stronger sense of Chinese 
identity may shield them from the inculcation of capitalist 
values. And they put socialism in a better light. 
Moreover, today's Taiwan government has loosened their 
/ 
stand on the reunification of China under the Three 
Principles of the People advocated by Sun Yat-sen. This 
may also account for the rightist students‘ higher 
acceptance to socialism. 
Hence, hypothesis (9) is supported with the exception 
on the evaluation of Socialist regime. 
Looking at cognition, it increases along the order of 
rightist, centrist and leftist schools, with a correlation 
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(cau-c) of .17. This means students in leftist schools are 
most knowledgeable of China while students in rightist 
schools are the least knowledgeable. 
Among the nine questions scoring a total of 14 marks 
testing for cognition, the questions related to Communist 
China and Taiwan score nine and five marks respectively. 
Hence, the design of the questions favours leftist 
students. But it is still disappointing to see that 
students in rightist schools are less knowledgeable in 
China than their centrist counterparts. 
To further investigate whether the choice of questions 
put the rightist students at a disadvantage or they are 
really poor in knowledge about China, the questions are 
divided into two sets: leftist—:related and rightist— 
related, and statistical analyses on means are then 
conducted accordingly. 
The mean score on the rightist—related questions for 
rightist, centrist and leftist students are 1.77, 2.18, and 
1.92 respectively (Table 7.18), showing that the centrist 
students are most knowledgeable about facts concerning 
! 
Taiwan. The poorest performance is found among the 
rightist students revealing their genuine ignorance. 
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Table 7.18 
Comparison on students“ performance 
on rightist & leftist-related questions 
Scliool Mean scores on Mean scores on 
partisanship Rightist-related Leftist-related 
questions questions 
Rightist 1.77 1.15 
Centrist 2.18 2.13 
Leftist 1.92 2.93 
On the leftist-related questions, the leftist students 
score the best among three while the centrist students come 
second. 
These findings suggest that leftist students are most 
knowledgeable with respect to facts about Communist China 
but not Taiwan whereas rightist students are terribly 
knowledge-poor in general. 
The knowledge-rich leftist students and the knowledge-
poor rightist students may reveal the fact that leftist 
schools are more concern with the transmission of knowledge 
about China. But similar emphasis is not found in rightist 
schools. 
Going back to the student‘s interest in China politics 
and school atmosphere (Table 7.17), the correlation in the 
second sample with students in the order of centrist, 
rightist and leftist is .08, suggesting that student * s 
interest in China affairs are higher in partisan schools 
than centrist schools. 
Concerning the discussion atmosphere, the frequency of 
discussion increases in the order of centrist, rightist, 
and leftist schools in the second sample, with a 
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correlation of .15. 
From the above findings on interest in China affairs 
and discussion atmosphere, the differences among the 
students in the latter are more significant than the 
< 
former. 
Once again, the knowledge-poor rightist students 
demonstrate higher patriotism, stronger Chinese identity, 
greater interest in China affairs and more discussion at 
school than the better-informed centrist students support 
the point that knowledge is not fundamental in building 
affective orientations and is also not necessarily be a 
consequence of higher interest and more discussion as is 
found in the comparison between Chinese and English 
schools. 
It then follows that hypothesis (10) is supported in 
general with the exception on knowledgeability• 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Findings IV: Relative Influence of Socializing Agents 
t 
Interaction among Agents 
Although the students in Hong Kong are subject to the 
Place Allocation System from the Education Department in 
getting a seat in the secondary school in accordance with 
their living district and academic performance, parents can 
by all means manage to send their children to the school of 
their own choice through personal network. 
Parents‘ decision on the choice of mass media is more 
obvious. Students normally read the newspapers and 
magazines available at home which are no doubt bought by 
their parents. By reading the same publication, both 
students and parents are subject to the similar influence 
resulting in alike orientations. Another possibility is 
that students read the newspapers and magazines as 
recommended by school teachers. It is a coininon practice 
for most centrist school to suggest or even assign students 
to read an English newspaper in order to improve their 
English. While for the partisan school, the school 
authorities normally recommend or assign students to read 
the resDGctive partisan newspapers and political magazines 
as a form of civic education. 
Given the important position occupied by the parents 
in setting the school environment and mass media impact, 
the interaction among the three agents are indeed 
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originated from family. Therefore, the interaction between 
family and school, between family and mass media, and 
between school and mass media are examined. 
Family versus School 
For the representative sample, the student-parents 
correlations are broken down according to private school, 
subsidized school, and famous and government schools but no 
significant and consistent of patterns of variations is 
found. 
But turning to the student-parents correlations broken 
down with respect to Chinese and English schools in the 
special sample (Table 8.1). The correlations of students 
studying in Chinese schools are higher than those in 
English schools with the sole exception of Chinese 
identity. This suggests that the influence from the 
Chinese schools has reinforced the students to identify 
more closely with their parents. 
Table 8.1 
Student-parents correlations controlled 
by schools‘ medium of instruction (tau-c) 
Attitudes Chinese English 
Evaluation of officials .36* .23* 
Evaluation of regime .43* .29* 
Trust .21* .20* 
Patriotisia . 57* .49* 
Chinese identity .36* .40* 
； N=4 67 N=416 
* p < .001 
Going to the student-parents correlations broken 
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according to school partisanship (Table 8.2), the 
correlations on evaluation of Beijing officials, patriotism 
and evaluation of Socialist regime are the largest for 
students in rightist school, while the correlations on 
i 
Chinese identity and trust are the highest for students in 
centrist school. 
Table 8.2 
Student-parents correlations controlled 
by school partisanship (tau-c) 
Attitudes Rightist Centrist Leftist 
Evaluation of officials .35* .22* .34* 
Evaluation of regime .42* .28* .40* 
Trust .17* .21* .19* 
Patriotism .58* .51* .52* 
Chinese identity .40* .42* .24* 
N=2 3 5 N=453 N=195 
* p < .05 
Contrasting the partisan school (leftist and rightist) 
with the non-partisan school (centrist), it is interesting 
to note that student-parents correlations are higher on the 
evaluation of Beijing officials, patriotism and evaluation 
of Socialist regime, whereas the correlations on Chinese 
identity and trust are larger in non-partisan school 
students. This implies that the partisan schools, no 
matter it is rightist or leftist, do reinforce the student-
parents correlations in the same respect. 
Family versus Mass Media 
In the representative sample, statistics shows that 
65.4 per cent of the students pick "bought by family" as 
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their reason of choosing their most frequently read 
newspaper, while 28.4 per cent say they have followed their 
own taste and only 5.0 per cent indicate their reason as 
"recommended by school". These figures suggest that 
I 
k 
parents are more successful than the school in influencing 
the students to follow their step on the choice of 
newspaper. Hence, it is interesting to explore whether 
those respondents who read the same newspaper as their 
parents would have greater affinity with their parents than 
those who do not. Student-parents correlations are then 
broken down according to different reasons on the choice of 
newspaper. 
Results show (Table 8.3) the student-parents 
correlations are higher for evaluative orientations in the 
category of "bought by family" whereas the correlations are 
larger for affective orientations in the category of 
"personal liking". This interesting finding suggests that 
for those students who think they are reading the newspaper 
of their own choice indeed share stronger affective 
attitudes with their parents than those who consider 
themselves as reading the newspaper of their parents‘ 
choice. In fact, the students * choice of "personal liking" 
upon reading a particular newspaper does not rule out the 
possibility that they are reading the same newspaper as 
their parents. But the other findings on the correlations 
on evaluative orientations do not come up with the same 
type of results seem to suggest that there are many 
potentialities. Nevertheless, there is no other evidence 
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in this study to prove either suggestions. 
Table 8.3 
Student-parents correlations controlled 
by reason of newspaper choice (tau-c) 
Attitudes Personal Bought School 
liking by family recommended 
Evaluation of officials .17* .34* .16 
Evaluation of regime .21* .33* .26 
Trust .18* .27* .49* 
Patriotism .56* .51* .42 
Chinese identity .48* .43* .37 
N=98 N=22 5 N=17 
* p < .05 
School versus Mass Media 
In the special sample, while the majority (60.8 per 
cent) of the respondents pick "bought by family" as their 
reason of reading the newspaper, 9.5 per cent say their 
choice are "recommended by school" and 27.6 per cent 
indicate their choice as "personal liking". Though these 
figures do not go far beyond that in the representative 
sample, it is interesting to investigate whether students 
reading the newspaper as recommended by school would follow 
the schools' party lines to a greater extent than those do 
not. 
The correlations between students‘ attitudes and 
school partisanship are broken down according to the choice 
of reading newspaper. Results (Table 8.4) show that for 
those students who read the newspaper as recommended by 
school do demonstrate greater correlations with the school 
partisanship with the only exception on trust. Students 
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who say they read the newspaper "bought by family" display 
larger correlations with school partisanship than those who 





Student-school partisanship correlations 
controlled by reason of newspaper choice (tau-c) 
Attitudes Personal Bought School 
liking by family recommended 
Evaluation of officials -.04 .19* .26* 
Evaluation of regime -.05 .15* .30* 
Trust .05 .15* .14 
Patriotism -.12* .09* .24* 
Chinese identity (tau-b) 06 .09* .48* 
N=174 N=3 83 N二 60 
* p < .05 
The relatively small (60) number of students reading 
the newspaper as "recommended by school" compared with 
"bought by family" even in the special sample suggest that 
family plays a stronger role in fostering the students‘ 
habit of reading a particular newspaper. Given the 
partisan school‘s generally weak influence on the students 
in the choice of newspaper, to what extent can they direct 
the students to read those newspaper of their own party 
lines? 
By crossing school partisanship with media 
partisanship (Table 8.5) , it is apparent that most rightist 
students (75.76 per cent) are indeed readers of centrist 
press, whereas more leftist students (50.32 per cent) tend 
to read the papers which fall into the party line with 
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their schools. In other words, the leftist schools are 
more concerned with requesting students to read the leftist 
press or make fuller use of the press to cultivate their 




School partisanship by media partisanship 
MEDIA 
Rightist Centrist Leftist Total 
P Rightist 31 125 9 165 
A 
R Centrist 71 232 29 332 
T 
Y Leftist 18 59 78 155 
Total 120 416 116 652 
Tau-b 二 .27, p < .001 
Holative Influence among Agents 
To establish the relative influence of different 
agents on the adolescents, stepwise regression analysis of 
SPSS-X is used. For every dependent variables, stepwise 
regression gives the beta weight of all the important 
independent variables in accordance with their relative 
effect on the dependent variable. 
Representative Sample 
Previous findings show that parental influence looms 
large among the five attitudes, whereas the dominance of 
centrist schools and centrist readers render the effect of 
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school partisanship and press partisanship to become 
invisible, barring patriotism and Chinese identity. The 
former is slightly related to China news exposure and 
television entertainment exposure, while the latter is 
( 
i, 
mildly related to school type (private, subsidized, 
government and famous), China news and television 
entertainment exposure. This also applies to cognition 
which is found to be affected by school type, China news 
and television entertainment exposure. 
Bearing this in mind, stepwise regression analyses are 
done by introducing the parental attitudes, China news 
exposure and school type which are all ordinal variables as 
independent variables. 
Results show that patriotism is strongly correlated 
with parental attitudes with product moment correlation of 
•62, the effect of China news and television entertainment 
exposure are so minimal that they are deleted in the 
analysis. Similar results are found for evaluation of 
Socialist regime which has a correlation (r) of . 39 with 
parents and for trust which has a correlation (r) of .25 
with parents. 
For Chinese identity (Table 8.6), the beta weights of 
parental attitude and school type are computed while the 
independent variable of China news exposure is deleted in 
the analysis showing that its effect is extremely 




Stepwise regression for Chinese identity 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
Parents .53 .27 .50 .000 
School type ‘ .29 ^ • Oil 
The beta weight for parents is .50 whereas it is .12 
for school type. And for multiple correlation, it is .53 
and . 54 for parents and school type respectively. The 
small difference in multiple correlation for parents and 
school type shows that school type does not contribute much 
toward the explanation of the formation of student‘s 
Chinese identity. Despite the seemingly close correlation 
between parents * Chinese identity and that of the students, 
the adjusted r square, which means the percentage 
variation of a dependent variable being explained by its 
independent variable, is only .27 and for parents and .29 
for school type. This implies that parental attitude does 
not account to a great extent for the student‘s attitude 
formation. 
On the evaluation of Beijing officials (Table 8.7), 
China news exposure can exert some impact on it in addition 
to parents. The beta weights of parents and China news 
exposure are . 28 and .13 respectively. The multiple 
correlations are . 27 and .30 accordingly. Nevertheless, 
the adjusted r squares are small with .07 and .08, showing 
that the influence of these two agents are not very great. 
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Table 8.7 
Stepwise regression for evaluation 
of Beijing officials 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
Parents .27 丨 .07 .28 .000 
China news .30 .08 .13 .000 
exposure 
Turning to cognition, its sources of influence include 
school type, parents, China news exposure and television 
entertainment exposure. To avoid duplication between the 
two media exposure variables which may hamper the running 
of regression, two analyses are done with the first one 
introduces school type, China news exposure, and parental 
interest as independent variables, while the second one 
replaces China news exposure with television entertainment 
exposure as one of the three independent variables. 
The beta weights of these two sets of independent 
variables suggest that China news exposure is more 
influential than television entertaininent exposure in 
shaping the youth * s predisposition toward China as the 
former comes second before parental interest in the 
stepwise regression analysis while the latter comes third 
after parental interest in another analysis. 
The beta weights in the analysis with school type, 
China news exposure, and parental interest are .49, .23, 
and .08 respectively (Table 8.8). The multiple 
correlations are in the order of .51, .56, and .56. 
139 
Table 8.8 
Stepwise regression for cognition 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
/ 
School type .51 ‘ .25 .49 .000 
China nev/s .56 .31 .23 •000 
exposure 
Family .56 .31 .08 .033 
politicization 
Since interest in China affairs is strongly correlated 
to patriotism, Chinese identity and cognition, and it is 
obvious that this interest is bound to be fostered by the 
socializing agents, it becomes interesting to explore the 
most influential agents in this respect. As interest in 
China politics is not strongly correlated to school type 
but to school discussion atmosphere, family politicization 
and China news exposure, these variables are taken as 
independent variables. 
Rvisuits (Table 8.9) shows that school atmosphere is 
most fundamental with beta weight of . 38 whereas beta 
weights are . 24 and . 16 for family politicization and China 
news exposure respectively. Since the multiple correlation 
of family politicization almost equals to that of China 
news exposure, this suggests that family does not play an 
important role in transmitting knowledge. 
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Table 8.9 
Stepwise regression for interest in China affairs 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
School atmosphere .41 ‘ .16 .38 .000 
Family .49 、 .23 .24 .000 
politicization 
China news .51 .26 .16 .002 
exposure 
It can be concluded that parental influence looms 
large in the case of Chinese identity and evaluation of 
Beijing officials than school type. But for cognition and 
China interest, which are more or less the responsibility 
of school and mass media, parental interest ranks third. 
But it must be clarified that parental interest is not 
a direct measurement on the knowledgeability of the parents 
and the extent the parents transmit their knowledge to 
their offsprings. It is likely that parental interest may 
not correspond to their knowledge level. Therefore, the 
relatively weak influence from parents on the youth‘s 
cognition may be partly due to the inaccurate indicator. 
Special Sample ‘ 
To discover the relative influence of different agents 
in socialization of the youth in the special sample, two 
different sets of regression analyses are done. One 
analysis puts both school and media partisanship in the 
increasing order of centrist, rightist and leftist. The 
other one ranks these two independent variables in the 
ascending order of rightist, centrist, and leftist. The 
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rationale behind is based on the different pattern of 
affective and evaluative orientations among these schools. 
Partisan school students are found to have higher 
affection, whereas rightist students have the worst 
evaluation of China. The above arrangements serve to 
reveal the greatest contribution from school and media 
partisanship on the formation of student‘s disposition. 
The results fall well within expectation. On the 
affective side, the analysis which ranks students in 
ascending order of centrist, rightist and leftist gives 
more significant results with parents acting as the most 
influential agent and school comes second. But for the 
other sample, only parental effect is found to be 
important. 
In both Chinese identity (Table 8.10) and patriotism 
(Table 8.11) , parents and school turn out to the more 
influential agents while media partisanship is deleted in 
the running of stepwise regression analysis. 
Table 8.10 
Stepwise regression for Chinese identity in sample with 
students in the order of centrist, rightist, & leftist 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
Parents .56 .31 .52 .000 
School partisanship . 58 . 34 • 17 • 000 
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Table 8.11 Stepwise regression for patriotism in sample with students 
in the order of centrist, rightist, & leftist 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
Parents .64 .41 .62 .000 
School partisanship .65 ,013 
Comparing these two attitudes, patriotism (Table 8.11) 
can be accounted for by parents and school to a greater 
extent than Chinese identity. The beta weights for 
patriotism are . 62 for parents, and . 10 for school. 
Multiple correlations give . 64 and .65 respectively showing 
the slight contribution from school. Regarding the 
adjusted r squares, they record a value of . 41 and . 42 
respectively. 
With respect to Chinese identity (Table 8.10), the 
beta weights are . 52 and . 17 for parents and school. 
Multiple correlations are .56 and .58 respectively whereas 
adjusted r squares are .31 and .34. 
In the case of evaluative orientations, evaluation of 
officials and trust can be accounted for to a larger degree 
. Vj ‘ 
in the analysis which arranges the students in the 
increasing order of rightist, centrist, and leftist. 
However, the second influential agent is different in these 
two attitudes. 
On the evaluation of officials (Table 8.12), the beta 
weights for parents, and media partisanship are . 34 and 
.15. Multiple correlations are .38 and .40 respectively. 
The adjusted r squares are just . 14 and . 16. Such low 
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values imply that these two agents are not very influential 
indeed. 
Table 8.12 
Stepwise regression for evaluation of officials in sample 
with students in the order of rightist, centrist, & leftist 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
Parents .38 .14 .34 .000 
Media partisanship .40 .001 
Comparing these findings with the sample which 
arranges the students in ：二e order of centrist, rightist, 
and leftist (Table 8.13). the school partisanship is the 
second agent with beta weight of . 12. Altogether, these 
suggest that media is more influential on partisan schools 
but school is more influential on leftist and centrist 
schools. 
Table 8.13 
Stepwise regression for evaluation of officials in sample 
with students in the order of centrist, rightist, & leftist 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
Parents .38 .14 .36 .000 
School partisanship .39 • 15 • 066 
On trust (Table 8.14) , the beta weights are .27 for 
f 
parents, and • 09 for school. Multiple correlations are .29 
and .30 while adjusted r squares are merely .08 and .09. 
144 
Table 8.14 
Stepwise regression for trust in sample with students 
in the order of rightist, centrist, & leftist 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
Parents .29 .08 .27 .000 
School partisanship .30 .09 .09 • 039 
Since previous finding shows that students in the 
rightist schools are acceptive toward socialism, the 
figures given in the stepwise regression analysis mirror 
their favourable attitudes. 
The beta weights on evaluation of Socialist regime 
(Table 8.15) for parents are . 43 and . 14 for school. 
Multiple correlations are .46 and •48 with adjusted r 
squares give .21 and .22. 
Table 8.15 
Stepwise regression for evaluation of regime in sample with 
students in the order of centrist, rightist, & leftist 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
Parents .46 .21 .43 .000 
School partisanship .48 • 22 • 14 • 019 
Contrasting the results with the sample which arranges 
the students in the order of rightist, centrist and leftist 
(Table 8.16), it is media instead of school acting as the 
second influential agent. But the beta weight of media is 
just .09 and its adjusted r square almost equals to that of 
parents. This seems to suggest that media plays a more 
significant role for students in leftist and centrist 
r 
schools but school partisanship is important for partisan 
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school. And it is the opposite to the case in evaluation 
of Beijing officials. 
Table 8.16 
Stepwise regression for evaluation of regime in sample with 
students in the order of rightist, centrist, & leftist 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
Parents .46 .21 .44 .000 
Media partisanship .47 ,09 • 040 
Previous finding also shows that both leftist and 
rightist readers are more knowledgeable than centrist 
readers. The analysis which ranks students in the 
increasing order of centrist, rightist and leftist gives 
larger figures (Table 8.17). 
Media partisanship comes first with a beta weight of 
• 28, parents come second with a beta weight of . 12 while 
school comes third with a beta weight of 12. The 
multiple correlations are .25, .27, and .29 while adjusted 
r squares are .06, .07, and .08 respectively. 
Table 8.17 
Stepwise regression for cognition in sample with students 
in the order of centrist, rightist, & leftist 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
Media partisanship .25 ‘ .06 .28 .000 
Family .27 .07 .12 .002 
politicization 
School partisanship .29 .08 -.12 .003 
In the sample which arranges students in the order of 
書 
rightist, centrist and leftist (Table 8.18), school stands 
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out to be most influential with beta weight of . 17 while 
family comes second with beta weight of .12. This may 
reflect that media is more influential for partisan school 
students but school is more important for leftist and 
centrist students. This is in contrary to the findings on 
the evaluation of Socialist regime• Or, this just shows 
that media and school have their own respective influence 
on the students in different aspects. 
Table 8.18 
Stepwise regression for cognition in sample with students 
in the order of rightist, centrist/ & leftist 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
School partisanship .17 .03 .17 .000 
Family .21 .04 .12 .003 
politicization 
On the breeding of interest in China affairs, 
surprisingly, it is family which is the most important 
source of influence for students in the special sample 
(Table 8.19) . The beta weight of family is .24. The 
second influential agent is media with China news exposure 
giving a beta weight of . 23. School partisanship comes 
third with beta weight of -.07. Looking at the multiple 
correlations, they are .28 for family, .36 for China news 
exposure and .36 for school partisanship, showing that the 
additional effect from school is almost minimal. 
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Table 8.19 Stepwise regression for interest in China affairs in sample 
with students in the order of rightist, centrist, & leftist 
Independent Multiple Adjusted Beta Sig T 
variables correlation r square weight 
Family .28 .07 .24 .000 
politicization 
China news .36 .13 .23 .000 
exposure 
School partisanship .36 -.07 .032 
In general, it is certain to say that parents are the 
most influential agents even in the sample with larger 
number of students from partisan schools which are supposed 
to exert greater influence on students than centrist 
schools. Owing to the relatively larger correlations 
between perceived parental attitudes and the students• 
attitudes, they have rendered the multiple correlations for 
the other agents to be small in running the regression 
analysis. Nevertheless, such analyses have still shed 
light on the contribution from other agents. 
Although media is found to be the most influential 
agent in affecting cognition, its relatively small adjusted 
r square raises doubt on the existence of some other more 
influential agents. 
Comparing the influence of school and media 
partisanship on the students by using the more significant 
findings, school turns out to be more influential on 
Socialist regime, trust, patriotism and Chinese identity, 
leaving media to be. an instrumental tool to echo their 
respective party line only. 
A look at the regression analyses on the 
148 
representative sample and the special sample reveals 
similarity in the ranking of socialization agents in 
affecting Chinese identity with which parents and school 
are important sources of influence. 
But for cognition, the representative sample finds 
school to be most influential while the special sample 
ranks media partisanship as the most significant. 
Nevertheless, in the case of interest in China 
affairs, the representative sample finds school to be most 
significant source of influence while it is family which is 
the dominant player in the special sample. 
In spite of these minor discrepancies between the two 
samples, it is doubtless to say that parents are the most 
important players. However, the small adjusted r squares 
in all analyses do suggest the existence of some other 
significant sources of influence. 
Briefly speaking, the correlations between parents and 
child are quite high with maternal dominance. Closeness, 
democratic home environment and family politicization can 
facilitate transmission of affective orientations. High 
socio-economic status families breed children with more 
similar attitudes. But it is not a good predictor of 
fosterage of interest in China affairs. 
In reviewing the findings on the effect of school as 
a socialization agent, school partisanship stands out to be 
the most salient feature. This is especially true among 
the leftist schools. The students display more favourable 
attitudes toward China and are more familiar with facts in 
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China. Although the students in rightist schools are lack 
of knowledge both about China and Taiwan, they still 
exhibit the typical features of a rightist. These include 
strong sense of Chinese identity, high level of patriotism 
but low evaluation on Beijing officials and low trust. 
Their unfavourable evaluative orientations toward Chinese 
authorities are expected as most rightists tend to picture 
the Chinese officials in a bad sense. Even the student‘s 
more tolerable attitudes toward socialism just mirror the 
Taiwan government‘s softening stand on the problem of 
reunification of China. 
Despite a reported higher frequencies of discussion on 
China affairs in school among leftist and rightist schools, 
and an actual higher level of cognition among leftist 
students, their self-perceived interest in China is not 
much higher than students in centrist schools (tau-c of .08 
in the second analysis). 
This discrepancy may be accounted for by the way the 
question is raised in the questionnaire. The question asks 
the student to indicate his level of interest toward China 
affairs in comparison with his classmates. Most 
respondents indicate their interest as "slightly 
interested" while the second . favourite choice is "quite 
interested". 
The missing link in this analysis is a more objective 
indicator on the general interest level in different 
schools. Thus, it is logical, to see students from schools 
with different partisanship come up with a similar level of 
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self-perceived interest. But it is obvious that the 
general interest level is higher in partisan schools than 
centrist schools, as is reflected in a higher frequencies 
of discussion on China politics in partisan school (tau-c 
of .15 in second analysis). 
For most students which fall into the category of 
centrist schools, academic performance seems to be an 
important indicator. Owing to their academically sound 
capability, these students are more knowledgeable in China, 
As a consequence, they have stronger Chinese identity. Of 
course, their commitment to China falls much behind the 





All the findings in this research consistently suggest 
the importance of parents in the socialization of 
adolescents‘ political orientation toward their mother 
country in spite of the student‘s different background. 
Since parents normally have a strong say in the 
student ‘ s choice of school and newspaper, it is thus not 
surprising to see that parental influence still looms large 
among partisan school students whom are subject to greater 
influence from school. 
The prevailing dominance of parental influence among 
the other agents is different from the foreign studies 
which appear to slight the role of family. But regarding 
the characteristics of family structure including 
closeness, democratic environment and family 
politicization, this research does manifest something 
slightly different from those of Jennings and Niemi (1968)• 
The major divergence lies on the effect of closeness 
between parents and child.- While closeness is not 
instrumental in transmitting, attitudes from parents to 
students in Jennings and Niemi 丨3 study, it does work in 
this study. This cpnspicuous variation may be viewed as 
stemming from the differences between Hong Kong and 
American families. Nevertheless, such discrepancies found 
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on the features of family structure between Hong Kong and 
American families are not reflected as a difference in 
maternal dominance and homogeneous parents. Therefore, 
maternal dominance and parental homogeneity may be taken as 
having universal application in the passing on of parental 
attitudes. 
On the other hand, it is found that students from 
higher SES families are subject to greater influence from 
parents. This implies there may exist some fundamental 
differences on family education across various SES 
families. However, correlations on SES with family 
politicization, democratic environment and closeness do not 
manifest important results, showing that there are some 
other significant characteristics of families from higher 
SES which have helped in shaping the youngsters‘ views and 
i 
have not yet been touched upon in this research. 
Problem of Perceived Parental Influence 
Though the results agree to past researches on the 
importance of family in socialization, one should still 
bear in the mind the fact that it is the students ‘ 
perception of parental attitudes is found to have close 
connection with that of students in this study. 
Hence, the reliability of the claim that parental 
influence is most important largely hinges on how far the 
students‘ can accurately estimate their parental attitudes 
regardless of their o w n . ) 
/ 
In the absence of the parents' actual attitudes for 
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comparison, the students are asked about their sources of 
perceived parental attitudes which may help shed light on 
this problem. 
Among the three choices thus given, 41.7 per cent of 
the students (in the representative sample) pick "talk with 
parents", 40.4 per cent take "get idea from parents ‘ 
discussion with friends" and 17.9 per cent choose "wild 
guess" with respect to the source of paternal attitudes. 
Regarding maternal orientations, 43.8 per cent select "talk 
with parents", 34.2 per cent say "get idea from parents ‘ 
discussion with friends" and 22.0 per cent draw "wild 
guess". These figures show that the majority of the 
respondents have based their perception of parental 
attitudes on acceptable ground despite a relatively larger 
number of students have admitted "wild guess" on the 
attitudes of their mothers with whom they have shown 
greater affinity. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the student-father and 
student-mother correlations in the case of "wild guess" are 
sometimes higher than the other two in the breakdown 
analyses cannot rule out the possibility of self-projection 
of one's opinion onto one's parents. But these students 
just form a minority. • 
Another evidence on the claim that the students are 
able to give parental attitudes irrespective of their own 
is the relatively larger number of "don't know" answers 
given to perceived parental .attitudes than "no opinion" 
responses in self-reporting orientations. Such observation 
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has suggested that the students ‘ can look upon their 
attitudes and the parental attitudes as two separate 
entities and are aware of their own views while remaining 
uncertain about their parents‘ ideas. 
But all these have still left the question of validity 
satisfactorily solved as the subjects may have by all means 
misunderstood their parents• stance. 
Despite that this research cannot address this 
problem, reference can be drawn from Niemi‘s (1973) 
findings. He reports that adolescents in the Michigan 
socialization study perceived themselves as attitudinally 
closer to parents by an average of . 10 (tau-b) than they 
were in actuality. He suggests that this misperception 
serves an important psychological function for the youthful 
respondents by reducing whatever tension may arise from 
asymmetry in parent-adolescent political attitudes. 
By taking account of the .10 deviation in the 
resulting student-parents correlations by using perceived 
parental attitudes instead of actual orientations, the 
average student-parents correlations in both representative 
and special samples in this study would drop from .37 (tau-
c) to . 27. But contrasting it with the average student-
school and student-mass media, correlations which are . 14 
and .13 respectively in the special sample, parental 
influence still dominates the scene. 
Mass Media 
It is quite disappointing to note the minimal effect 
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from mass media. The finding that mass media do contribute 
to knowledge does not go far beyond findings that news 
exposure is directly related to cognition while its 
influence on affective and evaluative orientations is far 
from being established. It is even more disappointing to 
note that it is the school instead of mass media which has 
played the strongest part in transmitting knowledge about 
China among centrist school students. Only in partisan 
school, mass media turn out to be the most important source 
of knowledge. 
But these discouraging results may stem from the fact 
that this research has focused on China which is not as 
widely covered as the territory itself in local media with 
the exception of partisan press. With the increasing role 
played by China in local politics and the inevitable 
parallel attention devoted by the centrist press, the Hong 
Kong citizens may come to learn more about Mainland China 
through mass media in the years ahead. The fact that the 
partisan press is the most significant source of knowledge 
for subjects in partisan school has already given evidence 
to this thought. 
To be fair, the special focus on the effect of 
political content of mass media in this research turns out 
to be unpromising in discovering its impact. It is 
necessary to extend further on the effect of the non-
political content on the youngsters whom are most 
vulnerable to the influence of the popular culture. 
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School 
In the absence of a formal civics curriculum from most 
schools, it is difficult to draw some common features from 
different schools which may have helped in the formation of 
students‘ attitudes. Even in the case of the partisan 
school which is supposed to emphasize more on civics or 
political education, students from these schools tend to 
play down the school ‘ s efforts in shaping their view in 
order to avoid being labelled as "rightist" or "leftist" 
during the indepth interviews. But they do admit that they 
are influenced by individual teachers whom have more 
intimate relationship with them. As details of such 
interpersonal influence fall outside the scope of this 
study, this part is left out。 It can only be sure that 
these partisan schools have recommended the students to 
read the respective partisan press as disclosed by the 
questionnaire. Moreover, a browse at the school premises 
would reveal that these schools have promoted the "sense of 
awareness" to current affairs to a greater extent than non-
partisan school by posting summaries of daily important 
news stories at the entrance of the schools or in the 
covered playground. 
Meanwhile, academic performance turns out to be a 
crucial factor among centrist school is understandable• 
This just mirrors the long established phenomenon that 
intellectuals are always the pioneers to reflect on the 
current issues of the nation.. Therefore, students who are 
more academically capable are likely to be more alert to 
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the surroundings and have stronger affection for one‘s 
native country. 
Putting these findings in the social context as a 
whole, it seems to suggest that the most influential agent 
is family even in the case of partisan school students 
which is quite unrelated and out of any organizational 
control as is found in school and press• In other words, 
it implies that it is rather difficult to conduct any 
systematic political socialization in a relatively free and 
pluralistic society like Hong Kong without any overhaul in 
the educational institutions and media organizations which 
are the usual tools in political education. 
Political Orientations 
Of course, a mere scan at the distribution of 
attitudes among students would be struck by the prevalence 
of negative attitudes toward China. This is especially 
obvious in the case of trust with about 60 per cent of the 
students lying on the extreme negative side of the scale. 
This nonetheless leads one to suspect that the June 4 
incident may have played a part in forming these negative 
orientations. It is also reaffirmed by a comparison 
between trust toward China before and after the June 4 
event. A drop of two scale points is noted. 
These negative attitudes shared among adolescents may 
imply the fosterage of a group of disloyal citizens in 
post-1997 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
government. And their stronger identification with the 
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territory than their parents is also not a blessing to the 
future ruler. But the dominating apolitical culture in 
Hong Kong created by the British government has left the 
people the choice to emigrant rather than to go against the 
government. 
Hong Kong is not alone in exhibiting unfavourable 
attitudes toward Mainland China. The Chinese community in 
Taiwan which are subject to one-sided propaganda from the 
Kuomintang may have shared even more hostile orientations 
to Mainland China despite their stronger national 
identification with China as a whole. It is expected that 
the mass media, the schools and the Taiwanese people all 
have stronger consensus on their views toward communist 
China than the Hong Kong citizens. 
Shortcomings and Future Research Direction 
It is undeniable that the findings in this research 
are superficial. Aside from stating the importance of the 
agents, it does not go deeper to reveal the effects from 
these agents. Moreover, the results show that the 
correlations even for the strong predictor of parental 
attitudes cannot account for the variations of the 
students‘ attitudes to a large extent. Such findings 
greatly suggest the existence of some other influential 
sources which have not -been explored in this study. 
Another possible direction on political socialization 
is to go deeper in spelling out the process involved. This 
can be done by applying models from psychology on learning, 
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information processing and so on to research on political 
socialization. Such attempts may serve as both a 
testification on these general models and an investigation 
on the peculiar aspects of political socialization. 
All in all, the major shortcoming in this study is the 
non-probabilistic procedure of sampling. In order to 
secure a larger response rate from the schools in a 
relatively short period of time, random sampling is given 
up. Though the sample now obtained is weighted 
accordingly, this still has rendered the sample not to be 





Fathers• birth place 
Birth place Percentage Percentage 
in representative in special 
sample sample 
China 72.9 76.5 
Hong Kong 22.0 17.8 
Taiwan .5 .3 
Others 4.7 5.5 
100.0 100.0 
Appendix 2 
Mothers “ h±A. Ill place 
Birth place Percentage Percentage 
in representative in special 
sample sample 
China 56.1 61.9 
Hong Kong 37.8 . 31.3 
Taiwan .3 .3 





among perceived paternal attitudes 
Govern Corrupt Merit Better Trust Basic Regime CCP Love Devote Ident Future Taiwan 
Govern 1.00 .34* .36* .44* .46* .21* .31* .46* .20* .10* .18* .19* .23* 
Corrupt 1.00 .24* .26* .28* .14* .15* .31* .08 -.00 .OA .06 .U* 
Merit 1.00 .46* .36* .10* .25* .37* .27* .19* .03 .18* .09 
Better 1.00 .40* .19* .32* .46* .24* .25* .11* .24* .14* 
Trust 1.00 .16* .33* .49* .36* .26* .29* .26* .26* 
Basic 1.00 .36* .22* .03 .01 .17* .12* .17* 
Regime 1.00 .30* .15* .05 .06 .17* .29* 
CCP 1.00 .34* .33* .18* .23* .25* 
Love 1.00 .61* .39* .18* .03 
Devote 1.00 .32* .14* .02 
Ident 1.00 .26* .07 
Future 1.00 .23* 
Taiwan 1.00 
Govern: The communist Chinese govt has governed China 
very well. 
Corrupt: Most communist Chinese govt officials are upright, 
only a few corrupt. 
Merit: Merits outnumber demerits throughout communist 
China regime in the past few decades. 
Better: The communist Chinese govt can govern better in 
the near future. 
Trust: trust toward China 
Basic: The Chinese authorities have not taken HK people‘s 
interest into consideration in drafting the Basic 
Law. 
Regime: Nothing is meritorious in Chinese socialist 
regime. 
CCP: I support the CCP. 
Love: I love China. 
Devote: I am willing to devote myself to China. 
Ident: Chinese identity . 
Future: Hong Kong future 
Taiwan: If it had been the Taiwanese govt ruling China,it 
would have done Letter than the communist Chinese 
govt • 
Cognit: level of cognition ‘ 




among perceived maternal attitudes 
Govern Corrupt Merit Better Trust Basic Regime CCP Love Devote Ident Future Taiwan 
Govern 1.00 .33* .31* .50* .49* .11* .26* .A7* .24* .13* .15* .18* .16* 
Corrupt 1.00 .28* .25* .25* .09 .11* .30* .14* .16* .08 .04 -.00 
Merit 1.00 .32* .31* .04 .08 .24* .25* .10 .11* .11* .13* 
Better 1.00 .39* .11* .33* .44* .23* .24* .10 .08 .13* 
Trust 1.00 .15* .19* .43* .31* .26* .12* .20* .22* 
Basic 1.00 .33* .16* .02 -.01 -.02 .13* .13* 
Regime 1.00 .21* .03 .03 .07 .08 .28* 
CCP 1.00 .20* .11* .14* .08 .09 
Love 1.00 .65* .48* .11* -.00 
Devote 1.00 .42* .11* -.02 
Ident 1.00 .20* .12 
Future 1.00 .14* 
Taiwan 1.00 
Govern: The communist Chinese govt has governed China 
very well. 
Corrupt: Most communist Chinese govt officials are upright, 
only a few corrupt. 
Merit: Merits outnumber demerits throughout communist 
China regime in the past few decades. 
Better: The communist Chinese govt can govern better in 
the near future. 
Trust: trust toward China 
Basic: The Chinese authorities have not taken HK people's 
interest into consideration in drafting the Basic 
Law. 
Regime: Nothing is meritorious in Chinese socialist 
regime. 
CCP: I support the CCP. 
Love: I love China. , 
Devote: I am willing to devote myself to China. 
Ident: Chinese identity 
Future: Hong Kong future 
Taiwan: If it had been the Taiwanese govt ruling China,it 
would have done better than the communist Chinese 
govt. 
Cognit: level of cognition 
* p < .05 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
I. The following questions just intends to know your media 
usage habit on a normal school day: 
1. Your average daily time watching 
a. TV ( ) hr ( ) min 
b. TV news ( ) hr ( ) min 
c. public affairs program ( ) hr ( ) min 
2. Your average daily time listening to 
a. radio ( ) hr ( ) min 
b. radio news ( ) hr ( ) min 
c. public affairs program ( ) hr ( ) min 
3. Do you have the habit cf reading newspaper 
1. yes 
2. no (go to Q.7) 
4. Your average daily time on reading newspaper 
( ) h r ( ) min 
5. Please name the newspapers you read in the order of 
reading frequency and indicate reason(s) of choice 
Name of paper 1 2 3 4 5 
Choice of reasons 1. personal liking 
2• bought by family 
3. scL-j1 assigned/teacher 
recominendation 
4. friends recommendation 
5. others 
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6. Your frequency of reading the following news pages 






7. Your average weekly time on reading magazines (cartoons 
excluded) ( ) hr ( )min 
8. Do you have the habit of reading political magazines 
1. yes 
2. no (go to Q.11) 
9. Your average weekly time on reading political magazines 
( ) h r ( ) min 
10. Please name the magazines you read in the order of 
reading frequency and indicate reason(s) of choice 
Name of magazine 1 2 3 4 5 
Choice of reasons 1. personal liking 
2. bought by family 
3. school assigned/teacher 
recommendation 
4. friends recommendation 
5. others 
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11. Do you read the China news pages of the following 
newspapers 
Newspapers Always Sometimes Seldom Never 
Ta Kung Pao 
Wen Wei Pao 
Hong Kong Times 
11. The following questions ask about your view toward 
Mainland China, please pick one choice to show how 
much you agree or disagree to the statements 
12. The communist Chinese government has governed 
China very well ( ) 
13. I love China ( ) 
14. Most communist Chinese government officials are 
upright, only a few corrupt ( ) 
15. Nothing is meritorious in Chinese Socialist 
regime ( ) 
16. The Chinese authorities have not taken Hong Kong 
people‘s interest into consideration in drafting 
the Basic Law ( ) 
17. I support the Chinese Communist Party ( ) 
18. Merits outnumber demerits throughout communist 
China regime in the past few decades ( ) 
19. The communist Chinese government can govern 
better in the near future ( ) 
20. I am willing to devote myself to China ( ) 
21. If it had been the Taiwanese government ruling China, 
it would have done better than the communist Chinese 
government ( ) 
Choice: 1 = very agree 
2 = quite agree 
3 = slightly agree 
4 = slightly disagr:ee 
5 = quite disagree 
6 = very disagree 
0 = no opinion 
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22. Your trust toward Chinese government after the 
suppression of democratic movement in Beijing in last 
June 
1. very trust 
2. quite trust 
3. slightly trust 
4. slightly distrust 
5. quite distrust 
6. very distrust 
7. no opinion 
23. Your trust toward Chinese government before the above 
event 
1. very trust 
2. quite trust 
3. slightly trust 
4. slightly distrust 
5. quite distrust 
6. very distrust 
7. no opinion 
24. How do you recognise yourself 
1. Hong Kong people 
2. Chinese 
3. others (please specify) 
25. What do you see as the best solution for the future of 
Hong Kong if there is a choice 
1. independent 
2. ruled by the British govt 
3. revert to China 
4. no opinion 
The following questions ask about your father's view toward 
Mainland China, please pick one choice to show how much he 
agrees or disagrees to the statements 
26.工 love China ( ) 
27. Nothing is meritorious in Chinese Socialist 
regime ( ) 
28. The communist Chinese government has governed 
China very well ( ) 
« 
29. If it had been the Taiwanese government ruling China, 
it would have done better than the communist Chinese 
government ( ) 
30. Most communist Chinese government officials are 
upright, only a few corrupt ( ) 
31.工 am willing to devote myself to China ( ) 
32. I support the Chinese Communist Party ( ) 
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33. Merits outnumber demerits throughout communist 
China regime in the past few decades ( ) 
34. The communist Chinese government can govern 
better in the near future ( ) 
35. The Chinese authorities have not taken Hong Kong 
people‘s interest into consideration in drafting 
the Basic Law ( ) 
Choice: 1 = very agree 
2 = quite agree 
3 = slightly agree 
4 = slightly disagree 
5 = quite disagree 
6 = very disagree 
0 = don't know 
36. In general, your father's trust toward communist 
Chinese government 
1. very trust 
2. quite trust 
3. slightly trust 
4. slightly distrust 
5. quite distrust 
6. very distrust 
7. don•t know 
37. How does your father recognise himself 
1. Hong Kong people 
2. Chinese 
3. others (please specify) 
4. don‘t know 
The following questions ask about your mother‘s view 
toward Mainland China, please pick one choice to show 
how much she agrees or disagrees to the statements 
38. Most communist Chinese government officials are 
upright, only a few corrupt ( ) 
39. I love China ( ) 
40. The communist Chinese government has governed 
China very well ( ) 
41. I support the Chinese Communist Party ( ) 
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42. The Chinese authorities have not taken Hong Kong 
people‘s interest into consideration in drafting 
the Basic Law ( ) 
43. If it had been the Taiwanese government ruling China, 
it would have done better than the communist Chinese 
government ( ) 
44. Nothing is meritorious in Chinese Socialist 
regime ( ) 
45. Merits outnumber demerits throughout communist 
China regime in the past few decades ( ) 
46. I am willing to devote myself to China ( ) 
47. The communist Chinese government can govern 
better in the near future ( ) 
Choice: 1 = very agree 
2 = quite agree 
3 = slightly agree 
4 = slightly disagree 
5 = quite disagree 
6 = very disagree 
0 = don't know 
48. In general, your mother's trust toward communist 
Chinese government 
1. very trust 
2. quite trust 
3. slightly trust 
4. slightly distrust 
5. quite distrust 
6. very distrust 
7. don‘t know 
49. How does your mother recognise herself 
1. Hong Kong people 
2. Chinese 
3. others (please specify) 
4. don‘t know 
50. What do your father and mother see as the best 
solution for the future of Hong Kong if there is a 
choice 
father mother 
independent 1 1 
ruled by the British govt 2 2 
revert to China 3 3 
no opinion 4 4 
don't know 0 0 
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51. What is your source of knowledge about your parents‘ 
view 
father mother 
talk with parents 1 1 
parents discuss with friends 2 2 
wild guess 3 3 
don't know 0 0 
III. The following questions ask about your relationships 
with father and mother, please indicate the answer 
for father and mother separately 
52. You feel your p a r e n t s d i s c i p l i n e on you is 
father mother 
very strict 1 1 
quite strict 2 2 
slightly strict 3 3 
slightly loose 4 4 
quite loose 5 5 
very loose 6 6 
53. Do your parents allow you to express your opinion on 
your own personal matters (e.g. choosing friends and 
school, participating in extra-curricular activities) 
throughout your upbringing 
1. never (go to Q.55) 
2. always don *t 
3. average don•t 
4. average do 
5. always do 
6. from time to time 
54. Would your parents accept your opinion 
1. never 
2. always don *t 
3. average don *t 
4. average do 
5. always do 
6. from time to time 
55. Are you close to your parents 
father mother 
very close 1 1 
quite close 2 2 
slightly close 3 3 
slightly distant 4 4 
quite distant 5 5 
very distant 6 6 
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56. How do you feel about your parents» care on you 
father mother 
too much 1 1 
quite much 2 2 
slightly much 3 3 
appropriate 4 4 
slightly little 5 5 
quite little 6 6 
very little , 7 7 
57. Do you depend on your parents for affection 
father mother 
very dependent 1 1 
quite dependent 2 2 
slightly dependent 3 3 
slightly independent 4 4 
quite independent 5 5 
very independent 6 6 
58. Do your parents normally discuss China affairs with 
you 
father mother 
always 1 1 
sometimes 2 2 
seldom 3 3 
never (go to Q.62) 4 4 
59. Do your parents discuss China affairs with you in 
times of great event about communist Chinese 
government (e.g. meeting of Chinese communist party, 
reshuffle of officials) 
father mother 
always 1 1 
sometimes 2 2 
seldom 3 3 
never 4 4 
60. Do your parents allow you to express your opinion in 
the discussion on China affairs 
father mother 
never (go to Q.62) 1 1 
always don't 2 2 
average don't 3 3 
average do 4 4 
always do 5 5 
from time to time 6 6 
61. Do your parents accept your view 
father mother 
never (go to Q.62) 1 1 
always don't 2 2 
average don't 3 3 
average do 4 4 
always do 5 5 
from time to time 6 6 
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62. Do your parents discuss China affairs between 
themselves 
never 1 1 
seldom 2 2 
sometimes 3 3 
always 4 4 
63. Do your parents discuss China affairs with their 
friends 
father mother 
never 1 1 
seldom 2 2 
sometimes 3 3 
always 4 4 
64. Are your parents interested in China affairs 
father mother 
very interested 1 1 
quite interested 2 2 
slightly interested 3 3 
slightly uninterested 4 4 
quite uninterested 5 5 
very uninterested 6 6 
65. Are your parents aware of China affairs (e.g. watch 
TV, listening to radio, reading newspapers and 
magazines) 
father mother 
always 1 1 
sometimes 2 2 
seldom 3 3 
never 4 4 
IV. The following intends to know the atmosphere on the 
discussion on China affairs in your school, please 
indicate your answer. 
66. Do your teachers (include school principal, panel) 






67. In general, how do you feel about your teachers‘ 
(include principal, panel) view toward China affairs 
1. very subjective with biased stand 
2. quite subjective with one-sided opinion 
3. quite objective with balanced viewpoint 
4. very objective with fair viewpoint 
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69. Do you participate in the above discussion 
schoolmates teacher 
always 1 1 
sometimes 2 2 
seldom 3 3 
never 4 4 
70. What is your level of interest on China affairs in 
comparison with your schoolmates in general 
very uninterested 1 
quite uninterested 2 
slightly uninterested 3 
slightly interested 4 
quite interested 5 
very interested 6 
71. How do you perceive the influence from the following 
people on your view toward China affairs 






Choice 1. very large 
2. quite large 
3. slightly large 
4. s],ightly small 
5. quite small 
6. very small 
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72. Do you agree with the following people on their views 
toward China 






Choice 1. very agree 
2. quite agree 
3. slightly agree 
4. slightly disagree 
5. quite disagree 
6. very disagree 
V . The following questions seek to know your knowledge on 
China affairs, please answer and indicate your source 
of knowledge 
Answer Source 
73. Chairman of PRC ( ) ( ) 
74. The secretary of CCP ( ) ( ) 
75. The foundation year of PRC ( ) ( ) 
76. Director of Xinhua News Agency ——Hong Kong Branch 
( ) ( ) 
77. President of Taiwan government ( ) ( ) 
78. National Day of Taiwan ( ) ( ) 
79. The legislative body of PRC ( ) ( ) 
80. Four Principles of PRC ( ) ( ) 
81 • The Three Principles of tlie Peoples ( ) ( ) 
Source 1. TV 
2. newspapers 
3. books , 
4. teachers 
5. schoolmates, friends 
6. parents , 
0. don't know 
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VI. The following questions ask for your family background. 
This information is very important and please answer. 
82. Your parents are 
1. both alive 
2. father alive, mother deceased 
3. mother alive, father deceased 
4. both are deceased 
5. divorced 
6. others 
83. Have your parents ever resided in Mainland China 
father mother 
yes 1 1 
no (go to Q.86) 2 2 
don't know (go to Q.86) 3 3 
84. How long did your parents reside in Mainland China 
father mother 
10 yrs or less 1 - 1 
11 一 20 yrs 2 2 
21 - 30 yrs 3 3 
31 - 40 yrs 4 4 
41 yrs or above 5 5 
don't know 0 0 
85. Did your parents reside in Mainland China during the 
following period (may tick more than one answer, and 
include those period within which your parents have 
left) 
father mother 
1949 or before 1 1 
1950 - 1956 2 2 
1957 - 1965 3 3 
1966 - 1976 4 4 
1977 or after 5 5 
don't know . 0 0 
86. Have your father's father and mother‘s father ever 
resided in Mainland China 
father's mother‘s 
father father 
yes 1 1 
no (go to Q.90) 2 2 
don't know (go to Q.90) 3 3 
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87. Did your father•s father and mother‘s father reside in 
China during the following period (may tick more than 




1949 or before 1 1 
1950 - 1956 2 2 
1957 - 1965 3 3 
1966 - 1976 4 4 
1977 or after 5 5 
don't know 0 0 
88. Your father's father and mother»s father status before 
communist takeover in Mainland China 
father‘s mother‘s 
father father 
landlord 1 1 
rich peasant 2 2 
peasant 3 3 
rich merchant 4 4 
merchant 5 5 
worker 6 6 
soldiers (CCP) 7 7 
soldiers (KMT) 8 8 
others 9 9 
don't know 0 0 
89. Were they rich before the communist takeover in 
Mainland China 
father's mother * s 
father father 
very rich 1 1 
quite rich 2 2 
neither rich nor poor 3 3 
quite poor 4 4 
very poor 5 5 
don't know 0 0 
90. Your sex 1. male 
2. female 
91. Your birth place 1. China 
2. Hong Kong 
3. Taiwan 
4. others 
92. Your age on your last birthday according to the 
Western calendar ( ) 
93. Your length of residence in Hong Kong ( ) yrs 
176 
94. Your parents‘ birth place 
father mother 
China 1 1 
Taiwan 2 2 
others (please specify) 3 3 
don't know 0 0 
95. Your parents‘ occupation 
father mother 
a. professional/senior technical staff 1 1 
(e.g. doctor, engineer, accountant, lecturer) 
b. senior staff in large commercial 2 2 
institution 
c. junior/middle rank staff in large 3 3 
commercial institution 
d. senior government official 4 4 
e. junior government official 5 5 
f• owner/partner of small/medium 6 6 
commercial institution (factory, shop) 
g. employee of sitia 11 /medium commercial 7 7 
institution (factory, shop) 
h. factory superintendent 8 8 
i. factory worker 9 9 
j. teachers in primary/secondary schools 10 “ 10 
k. hawker 11 11 
1. farmer/fisherman 12 12 
m. housewife 13 13 
n. retired 14 14 
o. jobless 15 15 
p. others (please specify) 16 16 
96. Your parents‘ education 
father mother 
no education 1 1 
primary school 2 2 
junior secondary school 3 3 
secondary school 4 4 
tertiary education/professional training 5 5 
university graduate 6 6 
graduate school . 7 7 
don‘t know 0 0 
97. Your family income (only include those family members 
who support the family financially) ( ) 
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98. Your house type 
1. public housing 
2. private housing (owned) 
3. private housing (rent) 
4. hostel 
5. others 
99. Your perceived SES 
1. upper 




100. When do you enrol in the present school 
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